The European Union is preparing for a scenario that officials increasingly consider possible: a serious hybrid attack resulting in multiple deaths on the territory of a member state. Diplomats are already discussing what the EU should do in such a situation, from sending intervention teams and financial aid to how the European response should be communicated.
The subject has been discussed in recent weeks by the ambassadors of the 27 member states, in restricted meetings, without phones and assistants. Politico learned details about these discussions from five diplomats and European officials.
The discussions have intensified after, in August, a drone loaded with explosives was discovered at Leipzig airport. "We must be prepared for something serious. Unfortunately, Leipzig showed us that a very serious incident, causing multiple casualties, is not excluded," says a senior European diplomat.
Another official goes further: "Considering the scale of Russia's actions, sooner or later there will inevitably be victims. It's a blind luck that there have been no victims so far."
Why Europe is afraid
Since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been accused of an increasingly intense campaign of cyberattacks, sabotage, and clandestine operations in Europe.
On the list of incidents fueling concern is the drone with explosives from Leipzig, a fire set at a Starlink ground station in Poland, which provides internet connections to Ukraine as well, plans to place incendiary devices in transport hubs in the EU and the UK, and repeated violations of airspace.
"It is quite evident that when Russia uses increasingly lethal tools to test our level of preparedness and willingness to take countermeasures, at some point there will be victims," says Teija Tiilikainen, director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.
A NATO diplomat says the same fear exists within the Alliance: if such an attack were to kill citizens of a member country, the pressure for a response would become very high.
Who responds: EU or NATO?
However, the preparations have opened another discussion in European capitals: who should coordinate the response and where the role of the EU ends and that of NATO begins.
Some states fear that Brussels is building mechanisms that duplicate NATO structures and that, in a crisis where decisions need to be made very quickly, the emergence of multiple command centers could complicate matters.
"If there is confusion or overlap, they risk slowing down the decision-making process, which has consequences, as time is always essential," explains Oana Lungescu, former NATO spokesperson and currently an expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a major British think tank specializing in defense and security.
There is also a trust issue. Several diplomats say that some governments avoid sharing very sensitive information in EU meetings, fearing that it could end up in the press or in Moscow. "My government is very reluctant to share sensitive information in Coreper or even in the room where leaders meet. Either they end up in the press or go directly to Moscow," says a diplomat from an Eastern flank state.
What Brussels is preparing
Ursula von der Leyen has already proposed an "emergency security protocol," through which EU states can react coordinated in such a situation. The idea is expected to appear, alongside the proposal for a European Security Council, in the new European Security Strategy, expected at the beginning of November.
However, some capitals believe that the EU already has mechanisms for such crises and that it would be more efficient to use them.
Among these is the integrated mechanism for a political response to crises (IPCR), used even during the pandemic. It allows for the rapid convening of meetings with the participation of NATO, UN, or other organization experts.
Oana Lungescu sees a relatively clear division of roles in the event of an attack with many victims: NATO deals with information and military deterrence, while the EU handles the civil response.
From Moscow's perspective, she says, these institutional delineations matter very little. "Honestly, Putin doesn't care if decisions are made by Coreper 2 or by the NAC. That's not how Moscow thinks," Lungescu points out.
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