Russia, which still dominates the discourse on security – a powerful, expansionist giant capable of overcoming NATO’s eastern flank – is increasingly resembling a ghost. What exists instead is a state in demographic collapse, militarily exhausted, and facing economic problems, armed with nuclear weapons. And this Russia is much more dangerous.
Almost 5 years after the Kremlin promised a „special three-day military operation,” Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9, 2026, will take place without tanks or heavy military equipment for the first time in nearly two decades. The Ministry of Defense cited the „current operational situation.” The world understands what that means: a significant portion of the equipment has been destroyed in Ukraine, is still there, or is needed to protect the regime.
This moment should compel a rethink in Western states. Russia, which still dominates the discourse on security - a powerful, expansionist giant capable of overcoming NATO's eastern flank - is increasingly resembling a ghost.
What exists instead is a state in demographic collapse, militarily exhausted, and facing economic problems, armed with nuclear weapons. And this Russia is much more dangerous, emphasizes Emzari Gelashvili, a former member of the Georgian Parliament, a former senior official in the Georgian Ministry of Defense, State Security Ministry, and Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Based on statistical data obtained from official Russian sources (Rosstat, Federal Treasury, Central Bank, and state media), Gelashvili outlines in an analysis published by Newsweek the dire situation in which Russia finds itself today and explains why this is not necessarily good news for the West.
This is not a Western analysis. It is what Russia says about itself, Gelashvili points out.
Russia heading for collapse
Russia's demographic crisis began long before 2022. In 1992, deaths exceeded births for the first time in peacetime - the so-called "Russian Cross."
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered hyperinflation, the collapse of the healthcare system, and a sharp decline in life expectancy for men. By 2025, according to Rosstat, the total fertility rate had dropped to 1.37 children per woman - well below the replacement level of 2.1.
Three waves of emigration have worsened the crisis, depriving Russia of its most educated and productive citizens. The latest wave, triggered by invasion and mobilization, saw over a million people leave. Even Belarus, Russia's closest ally, has now closed its borders to young Russian men avoiding conscription.
The war has dramatically accelerated this decline.
Independent research by Mediazona and BBC Russian verified over 213,000 identified deaths by the end of April 2026. Western estimates put the total number of casualties (killed and seriously injured) at nearly a million - mostly young men in the peak reproductive and working age.
Economically, the situation is equally bleak:
- Russians now spend 39% of their income on food - a record in the last 16 years.
- New car prices have increased by 216% since 2014.
- The federal budget deficit reached 5.63 trillion rubles in 2025, while the broader consolidated deficit reached 8.29 trillion.
- Almost 40% of federal spending goes to defense and security - a burden similar to the Cold War for a much weaker economy.
Russia entered the war at its maximum sustainable capacity without general mobilization. After years of attrition, it has depleted most of its Soviet-era equipment stocks.
A conventional confrontation with NATO is not just unlikely - it has become prohibitively expensive and unsustainable demographically, according to the former Georgian official.
The danger of Russia's collapse
The real strategic risk is not a confident Russia launching a conventional attack on the Baltic countries. It is the behavior of a cornered state armed with nuclear weapons perceiving itself in terminal decline, Gelashvili emphasizes.
A leadership facing military failure and internal crises may consider that the nuclear threat or escalating hybrid warfare offers the best chance to assert itself against the West. This risk does not negate nuclear deterrence but significantly complicates it - making traditional calculations much more dangerous.
For too long, Western policy has focused on that Russia of the '80s rather than the weakened Russia of 2026. This misdiagnosis risks either strategic complacency or dangerous overreaction.
A wounded bear feeling cornered is the most dangerous
According to the author, the correct approach lies between abandonment and annihilation. Strict sanctions must be maintained, sustained military support for Ukraine, and strong conventional deterrence.
At the same time, quiet channels and credible pathways to the real centers of power within Russia - oligarchs, siloviki (people from the state's force structures), and regional elites - must be developed, who may one day conclude that the current trajectory is unsustainable.
A wounded bear is dangerous. A wounded bear that believes it has no way out is much more dangerous. The West must stop fearing a Russia that no longer exists and start preparing for the risks posed by the one that does.
T.D.