When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, President Vladimir Putin changed the world in ways we are just beginning to understand. Russia’s initial advance towards Kiev failed, the fragile consensus following the Cold War held, and the response was vigorous.
This was a violation of international norms that would not be tolerated. Europe and the United States imposed sanctions on Russia, provided military assistance to Ukraine, and President Joe Biden declared, in front of a crowd in Warsaw, that Vladimir Putin cannot „remain in power.” The Russian regime had fatally crossed the limits, writes New York Times in an analysis.
And yet, the support given to Ukraine has always been limited; enough for Ukraine not to lose, but not enough to win. And the war, instead of restoring the strength of the international order and the alliances that once shaped it, inaugurated an era of high-intensity conventional wars, with ambiguous results. President Trump inherited a new difficult order in his second term and contributed significantly to shaping it.
Two realities
The war in Ukraine delineates two realities, both revealing important new truths about the international affairs of the 21st century.
Firstly: Ukraine was not defeated. Russia has a larger population, economy, and army, but Ukraine's determination and technological ingenuity - especially the ability to innovate, build, and use drones - slowed Russia's advance to near stagnation. An unusual type of asymmetric war emerged, in which major powers suddenly become vulnerable.
Secondly: Russia was not defeated. Despite sanctions, plummeting oil prices, and freezing a large portion of the central bank's reserves, Russia's economy did not collapse. Russia found numerous trading partners, including within the BRICS group, a bloc largely made up of developing nations seeking to act as a counterbalance to Western domination.
The global economy is diffuse enough that Russia was able to acquire restricted chips and technology from outside Europe and the United States. Before the war with Iran, four years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the Russian economy showed signs of strain, but not enough to temper Putin's ambitions.
The world is changing rapidly
After initially trying to create a global coalition in support of Ukraine, Europe gradually compartmentalized the war within its general foreign policy. Europe and the United States continue to do some business with Russia and a great deal with India, China, and other Russian trading partners. Various European leaders have visited Beijing to deepen trade relations with China, and in January, the European Union announced a new trade agreement with India.
The world is changing rapidly. Ukraine has become an accelerator for a type of war specific to the 21st century, where smaller states can thwart powerful adversaries using cutting-edge, sometimes cheap and easily mass-produced technology, and blocs and alliances that once acted in concert to deter aggressors are, at best, only partially effective.
All of this was evident in Iran as well. An Iran that is militarily weaker than the United States and Israel managed to threaten Gulf states and block the Strait of Hormuz using inexpensive drones, creating a global energy crisis that could have long-term effects.
Within weeks of the conflict erupting, the Trump administration was forced to lift sanctions on some Russian and even Iranian oil - an unexpected gain for both regimes. Iran, which supplied drones to Russia, seems to have paid more attention to the war in Ukraine than the United States, which initially depleted its stock of costly interceptor missiles. (Ukrainian drone specialists are now highly sought after in the Middle East.)
Ukraine, a more important European partner
The outbreak of a major war in the Middle East will make it even more difficult for Europe to support Ukraine. Europe is dependent on gas and oil from the Middle East, has military assets in the region, and many Europeans live there. Nevertheless, the instability heading towards Europe from the Middle East will make Ukraine a more important European partner.
By conducting military operations in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean, the United States is clearly overstretched globally, and its war with Iran risks ending humiliatingly. Precisely because Russia economically benefits from the war with Iran and precisely because this conflict will diminish the scope and prestige of American power, Europe must be the bastion of European defense, and Europe's fundamental challenge is the survival of Ukraine.
So far, Europe has rejected Trump's request to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In response, Trump warned that NATO faces a "very bad" future, which could likely include further reduction of support for Ukraine. By any standard, it would be a fundamental mistake to consider Ukraine's cause as peripheral to US interests.
A crucial precedent will be set in Ukraine
In Europe, Ukraine is combating chaos, and Europe's stability is essential for the US economy, for NATO's status in US foreign policy, for the viability of US alliances in general, and for Europe's value as a source of investment and as a market for American goods and services.
In one way or another, a crucial precedent will be set in Ukraine. If Russia is allowed to dismantle Ukrainian statehood, changing borders by force and the breakup of states could once again become a common feature of European life, as they were in Europe's past. An open, protracted military conflict in Europe could eventually intersect with an open, protracted military conflict in the Middle East.
If, on the contrary, Ukraine is supported sufficiently and manages to hold its ground, then Europe will remain at least a zone of order and peace. In a world increasingly burdened by militarism and violence, the attractiveness of order and peace could prove to be contagious.