Donald Trump will not succeed in convincing Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine by offering economic incentives; instead, he must make him understand that prolonging the conflict will cost Russia more than peace.
In an analysis published in The Atlantic, Thomas Wright argues that the current strategy of the American president risks encouraging Moscow to continue the war and block an acceptable agreement for Kyiv.
(Thomas Wright is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. During the Joe Biden administration, he served as the senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council)
The author begins with a past example. In 1965, American President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to convince North Vietnam's leader, Ho Chi Minh, to give up support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam, promising economic aid for the country's development instead.
Johnson practically proposed building infrastructure projects on the scale of those carried out by the Tennessee Valley Authority, which had transformed a poor region of the U.S. through dams, electricity generation, and agricultural modernization.
The American president was convinced the offer would be too advantageous to refuse, but Ho Chi Minh rejected it because he prioritized the reunification of Vietnam under communist leadership over the economic benefits promised by the U.S.
This episode is now studied in political psychology courses to illustrate how presidents can naively come to believe that transactional politics, common at the state and city levels, will work on the international stage as well.
However, a leader who considers the territorial, ideological, or strategic stake essential will not give up their objective just because money or economic advantages are offered.
Donald Trump fell into the same trap in his relationship with Vladimir Putin
Donald Trump seems to believe that the right economic incentives will convince the Russian leader to make peace with Ukraine.
The approach does not work. Moreover, it blocks the only realistic way to end the conflict with Ukraine and increases the risk that the war will expand and worsen.
At the beginning of his second term, Trump was surprised that Putin was not willing to quickly end the war by freezing territorial lines and promising that Ukraine would not join NATO.
Instead of trying to improve Ukraine's position on the battlefield or exert pressure on Russia through sanctions, Trump decided to convince Putin that peace would bring him financial benefits.
Trump removed his envoy for Ukraine, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, from the negotiation team after the Kremlin complained he was too favorable to the Ukrainians, and replaced him with his friend Steve Witkoff, a real estate magnate. Russian financier Kirill Dmitriev was to be Trump's intermediary in relations with Putin.
Witkoff and Dmitriev drafted, nearly a year ago, an agreement that provided for the complete lifting of sanctions, joint Russian-American business projects, and even Russia's readmission to the G7, turning the group back into the G8.
The plan failed, however, because of Vladimir Putin's demand that Ukraine cede territories that Russia had not captured on the battlefield.
But Witkoff and Dmitriev continued their efforts. The most recent version of the agreement appeared last week, while relations between the U.S. and Ukraine reached their lowest point since the Oval Office dispute in February 2025.
Trump and Putin agreed that Russia would supply diesel fuel to the United States and global markets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky harshly criticized the deal, saying it "is not fair and honest" and seems "like a birthday gift for Putin" (whose birthday was October 7).
Angry, Trump called for Zelensky's replacement and stated that he is harder to deal with than Putin.
In the following days, Kyiv accused Washington of restricting intelligence cooperation, including withholding information about imminent ballistic missile attacks. The American administration denied the accusations.
The Financial Times reported that the administration is considering returning part of Russia's frozen assets as an incentive to achieve a partial ceasefire. Trump then suspended sanctions against Russia under the Lindsey O. Graham Act, stating that the decision is in the national interest of the United States.
In a post on Truth Social, Trump said he is negotiating to end the war and does not "want to do anything that recklessly removes Russia from the negotiating table."
As relations between the U.S. and Ukraine seemed to collapse, the American administration tried to offer a broader justification for its decisions. A senior official told the Washington Post that, since negotiating an agreement on Ukraine was proving difficult, the White House planned to expand discussions and try to obtain a regional agreement. This would include provisions for supplying energy to Europe through a new pipeline, with profits shared between Ukraine and Russia, as well as resolving differences between Moscow and European countries.
This proposal is essentially Johnson's plan. The naivety behind it might be excusable if Putin were a new leader without a known history, but that is not the case. Putin is a predictable figure. Ukraine is his obsession, his grand target. He wants to subjugate it and has shown he is willing to pay an enormous price to achieve his goal.
The immediate diplomatic problem Trump must solve is that Putin will not accept anything less than the cession of additional territories by Ukraine, something no Ukrainian leader can accept.
Russia has little chance of conquering these territories by force: the front line is largely static due to the very high density of drones in the area.
The Russian leader pins his hopes on two scenarios
The first is to defeat Ukraine this winter through a brutal air campaign that destroys its energy network and causes suffering for millions of people. Putin perhaps hopes that such pressure will lead to the collapse of the Ukrainian front or will compel Kyiv to accept Moscow's demands at the negotiating table.
The second prospect is the intensification of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine's European partners.
Moscow is already linked to plans for assassinations, arson, and the placement of drones loaded with explosives at airports. Several European leaders, including Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron, have warned that Russia is considering drone and missile attacks on Eastern European states, which it might later deny.
Putin hopes that this hybrid war will weaken European governments and bring to power parties that will stop aid to Ukraine and pressure Kyiv to capitulate to Russia's demands.
If Putin succeeds in both endeavors—weakening Ukraine during the winter and fueling instability in Europe—he will be confident that Russia can achieve a bloody victory in the next two years.
Putin seems to believe that time is on his side
Trump's concessions reinforce this impression. However, if Trump manages to change the Russian leader's expectations about the future, a diplomatic agreement could become possible. More precisely, Trump must convince Putin that Russia's situation will not improve and that the deal he can obtain now is more advantageous than one he might get later.
This means doing everything possible to help Ukraine withstand Putin's winter campaign: providing Kyiv with as much air defense as possible, offering early warnings of incoming missiles, encouraging Western allies to seize Russia's sovereign assets to provide economic support to Ukraine, and helping Kyiv impose costs on Russia (through strikes on refineries and beyond).
It also means helping Europe discourage Putin from intensifying his hybrid war against NATO member states. This is difficult but achievable.
Europe must convince Putin that escalating attacks, especially those causing casualties, will increase Europe's and the United States' involvement in the conflict in Ukraine.
For example, Europe could announce that if Russia launches missiles or drones against NATO member states, a European coalition will deploy air defense systems in western Ukraine.
Trump could tell Putin that if Russia continues to harass Europe, he will reach an agreement with Elon Musk to allow Ukraine to use Starlink in attacks on military targets inside Russia.
The Solution for Trump
If one of Russia's attacks caused a large number of casualties, for example, by shooting down a passenger plane, the allies could designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.
When I worked at the National Security Council during the Biden administration, I conveyed this warning to the Russians after they devised a plan to place incendiary devices on planes carrying DHL parcels. I clearly explained to them that such a designation would most likely lead to the closure of the Russian embassy in the United States. The plans were abandoned, the author writes.
If we help Ukraine withstand the winter and deter Russian attacks on Europe, then the diplomatic path remains open. But, to conclude an agreement, Trump must convince Putin that his window of opportunity is closing. In this case, Trump's political weakness could become an advantage.
Putin undoubtedly fears that Trump's successor—whether a Democrat or a Republican different from J.D. Vance—will be more favorable to Ukraine. A new administration will likely increase American support for Kyiv and rebalance any agreement made during Trump's term, possibly conditioning the easing of sanctions on Russia's withdrawal from all Ukrainian territory.
Trump could turn this prospect into a pressure tool. He can tell Putin that there is a real opportunity to achieve a favorable agreement, but that it will not last forever.
Only he can deliver such an agreement.
If Putin continues the war, he will no longer conquer territories, Ukraine will resist and maintain its capability to strike targets inside Russia, Europe will become more involved, and favorable conditions will expire.
Then, Trump must seriously revise the offer so that it is acceptable to Ukraine. This means at least freezing the front lines and refusing legal recognition of the occupied territories.
Trump wants to be remembered as the president who ended the war in Ukraine. But if he does not change course, he could go down in history as the president who gave Putin the confidence necessary to expand and prolong the conflict.
Trump spent nearly two years trying to convince Putin that peace would bring him more benefits than war. To achieve a ceasefire, he must now convince him that war will cost him more than peace.
B.B.