As difficult as it may be for many to accept after the execrable PSD governance, which politically and economically brought us to the current critical situation, the recovery of Romania largely depends on the stability of this party.
Because no matter who the President of Romania is, the recently voted parliamentary configuration remains unchanged.
Marcel Ciolacu couldn't have survived as the leader of PSD
Mr. Ciolacu held on as much as he could, but the political disaster he caused was the greatest since the existence of this party under all its names in the last three decades. And he caused it believing that a party and a country could be led solely through tricks and schemes.
All the madness Romania went through started with his maneuvers to secure the safest presidential final.
That's why Diana Șoșoacă was taken out of the race, the starting point of the storm, that's why he donated 150 thousand votes on November 24. Well, in the end, the dreamed and missed second round by Marcel Ciolacu became a reality, and George Simion successfully fulfilled his "mission."
But at the end of this madness, PSD found itself with two presidential finals where it was just a spectator, with presidential elections where it had no candidate at all, and with its worst parliamentary score in its history.
The pressure from the humiliated party's interior exceeded Marcel Ciolacu's ability to make schemes. He was forced to resign from the leadership of PSD after, still under the party's pressure scared by the string of defeats and the rapid loss of its own electorate, he accepted the withdrawal from the government.
The problem is that, unlike PNL, which after the November earthquake had a natural leader to take the reins, PSD lacks a natural successor to Marcel Ciolacu, a strong leader with widely recognized authority in the territory and with a national political stature.
PSD is going through a major leadership crisis, probably the most severe in its history.
With Guns on the Table
Without such a natural leader, the party is divided into factions that have their guns on the table. Some are already making bellicose statements in the public space and pointing in different directions.
There is one element, however, about which there seems to be a majority view within PSD, that given its current state and the severe corrective measures to come, the party has no place in the government, it must stay in the Opposition, lick its wounds, calm its internal demons, make peace, find its new leaders, and, crucially, win back the massive electorate that migrated to AUR.
If PSD returns to government and becomes complicit in measures that will have a major electoral cost while AUR bombards the Opposition Government with populism, the chances of social democrats to regain lost voters will dramatically decrease, and the upcoming elections, which are already being prepared, could be lethal for PSD.
And AUR is not the only danger for PSD. Victor Ponta tested his traction on his own on May 4, and the result could encourage him to try a new political construction, as rumored. The potential pool is not negligible.
Romania is divided in two. Almost half is rather eurosceptic and Trumpist, which is why they voted for Simion, while on the other side, a little over half, it's hard to say how many voted for Nicușor Dan out of conviction and how many were pushed by the terrifying image projected by Simion and Georgescu.
But the entry of a crisis-ridden PSD into government, especially as the main party in power, could cause major damage to governance, as it would inevitably transfer its internal convulsions.
On the other hand, without PSD, there cannot be a majority government, this is not a statement from political science, but from arithmetic.
So What Are the Options?
The best option would be a majority government, as Ilie Bolojan himself stated in all the interviews before the elections. But this would require, as I mentioned, PSD to somehow be convinced to return.
For now, it's hard to say whom you actually call when you want to reach out to PSD, paraphrasing a famous saying. Will PSD reach an internal agreement on this issue and be represented by someone with real decision-making power in the complicated negotiations for forming the Government?
If they somehow manage to efficiently negotiate a new government, could PSD end up without the Prime Minister? Insisting on it would put Nicușor Dan in a position to deliver the first disappointment to his own electorate. Giving up the position would be another blow to the party's pride.
If they agree not to appoint the Prime Minister, it would only be to play, just like during the Ciucă Government, both in power and in the Opposition, making the Prime Minister's life even harder as he would have to bear all the unpopular measures alone, even being attacked from within the coalition for the government's performance. As I said, we've seen this movie before.
Without PSD, the option would be a weak minority government, dependent on PSD for every measure and obliged to make huge concessions for occasional support. And at PSD, concessions mean appointments to positions and money. Anyone assuming such a dependent position on PSD would be a political suicide and even then, there are no guarantees that they would be able to do what is necessary to stop the economic decline.
Another option would be a technocrat government, behind which the entire political class would hide, as in 2016. It would also be a weak government, but without political accountability. There is already talk that the Prime Minister position could be taken from the BNR area in this scenario.
Many are looking with great hope at Ilie Bolojan given his portfolio of successes and reforms in Oradea. However, there Bolojan had a majority, authority, played on solid political terms, not in a minority, surrounded by hostile forces and exposed to blockages at every step.
Sure, he has public support, but I fear it is for the idea of a savior and very volatile depending on each decision, as we have seen in recent months. How many insults he received for refusing to run and for keeping his word, for example.
I would like this to be an exception this time, but the limits of support are determined by realistic expectations and the effects of reforms on one's own life.
President Dan himself does not expect a simple solution and talks about 3-4 weeks of negotiations. The issue is that on June 4, Romania must present the fiscal reform plan in Brussels, which PNRR depends on, and a provisional government cannot do that.