For the first time in 10 years, Klaus Iohannis is faced with the real and likely prospect of losing power. None of his strategies to seize a high international office have succeeded.
His attempt to forcefully, even through blackmail, within NATO, instead of helping him, has further distanced him from his goal, as it has drawn a wave of harsh criticism from major international publications.
It has become clear on this occasion not only that he has a wrong strategy, but also the real extent of his foreign political stature, extremely modest, and the cost of the way he chose to exercise his presidential mandate, with immense defiance towards the people and what foreigners call "accountability", meaning the obligation to be accountable. This has been seen in major chancelleries.
With each passing day, he is increasingly just a former president, something he does not seem to want to acknowledge. And somewhere it is understandable that the exercise of power for such a long time, especially when it is strictly self-serving, as it was in Mr. Iohannis's case, undoubtedly, without doubts, worries, and shame, creates dependence.
The Failed Plan
Mr. Iohannis's plan was to maintain power through Nicolae Ciucă, a docile, disciplined, and convenient instrument. A joint candidacy with PSD, in which Marcel Ciolacu would receive the position of prime minister, would have been a very convenient plan for Mr. Iohannis, but matched his political acumen.
Because he did not take into account essential elements: even if Mr. Ciolacu would have liked to avoid the risk of candidacy, it was impossible to convince the largest party in Romania not to have a candidate and to support another party's candidate.
Accustomed to the extreme servility of PNL, which allowed itself to be emasculated and fulfilled without complaint every presidential wish, PSD has the reflexes of a major party.
Furthermore, the departure of the PSD president for the presidential candidacy opens the battle for the position, another tempting exercise in a party where presidents are not appointed from the Cotroceni Palace. In short, it could not work and it did not work.
Then, Mr. Ciucă's profile is completely inadequate for such an electoral exercise. He simply does not have traction, and the campaign designed for him has made him a laughingstock, worse in politics than in hatred, as Crin Antonescu aptly pointed out.
The political battle sharpens between the two ruling parties with rival presidents, so the dust settles on Mr. Iohannis's comfortable stability, and even Marcel Ciolacu cannot afford to remain the convenient partner he used to be.
The lack of options is evident, the loss of traction as well, so the internal opposition within PNL is starting to show its teeth. Crin Antonescu's attack was eloquent.
The overthrow of Nicolae Ciucă was supposed to happen after a potential disaster in the European elections, avoided thanks to Marcel Cioalcu. The contenders for the leadership of PNL are quite evident and are now waiting for the disaster in the presidential/parliamentary elections.
No Solution
For the first time, political sources say, Klaus Iohannis realizes the inadequacy of Nicolae Ciucă and would not exclude changing the candidate.
However, he has no one to replace him with, considering that the main criterion is unwavering loyalty. The only one who would meet the criterion is Cătălin Predoiu, but he has two major problems.
One is the complete detachment from the party, which does not perceive him as one of their own, the second is the total lack of concern for his image, communication, and mastering this essential craft in a campaign, especially one of such caliber.
After the external game, for Mr. Iohannis, the internal one is starting to close as well, a finale he prepared defiantly in almost every minute of the last 10 years.