This could lead to a completely new agenda in the European Parliament, and Viktor Orban could gain support instead of disapproval.
The economic crisis and war-induced fatigue, the second war which, although in the Middle East, triggers strong polarization in the West, taxes, and farmers’ protests are reflected in the shifting electorate towards populist and semi-democratic platforms.
If this summer the atmosphere was one of optimism, with an energy crisis kept under control and with less disastrous effects than anticipated, with Ukraine ready to start the counteroffensive and with the pandemic becoming part of the past, the forecasts are not so encouraging now, when winter is no longer mild.
There are several things that, cumulatively, have led opinion polls to measure more of a retaliatory social temperature and a turn towards platforms placed under the generic umbrella of populism:
• The lack of a decisive victory for Ukraine and Vladimir Putin's resistance;
• The possibility that the US may no longer financially support Ukraine;
• The major polarization created by the Israel-Hamas war, with cascading social consequences: pro-Palestinian protests in Western capitals and, in this context, a resurgence of anti-Semitism. The new scandal in The Hague, which could seriously jeopardize Rutte's chances for NATO leadership, shows that the Palestinian issue influences the political and social agenda;
• The resilience of the "bad boys," which, in social perception, means validation of leaders with an iron fist, as Gideon Rachman puts it: Robert Fico, back in power in Slovakia, Viktor Orban in Budapest, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen in France, Karl Nehammer in Austria. The only exception comes from Poland, where Donald Tusk has returned to power after years of the illiberal PiS regime, but the guillotine methods he has chosen to clean up the institutions could soften the good story;
• EU hesitations regarding migration policy, in the context of increased dissatisfaction in Italy, Germany, Austria;
• Farmers' protests, which keep the agenda not only in Romania but also circulate social resentments, after two years of war and support for Ukraine.
The European Council on Foreign Relations, a European think tank, has made the first projections to consider for the European elections in June 2024. Thus, anti-EU formations have the first chance in nine countries - Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia - and a significant share (for the second or third position) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Romania.
The effect could be a decrease in the influence of the Renew Europe group, which could drop from third place in the European Parliament, with its place being taken by the radical right, the Identity and Democracy group.
The European Parliament has not been in this situation before, but it is possible to neutralize the hard right agenda through an EPP-European socialists alliance, after the elections, at least on major issues, which balance liberalism and EU authority, to the detriment of populism and the sovereignist trend.
What do we mean when we say populism
Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde reviews, in a landmark work, how populism, extremely versatile and sometimes useful, but mostly harmful if used in democracies, undermines institutions and societies, polarizes and divides communities into "us" and "them."
The novelty that Cas Mudde brings to the analysis is a much clearer and non-moralizing perspective: there are situations where populism acquires positive connotations, for example, when it is used to mobilize society's participation in political decision-making, during transitions from dictatorship to democracy.
Of course, perverted forms also appear, as in the case of Corneliu Vadim Tudor, mentioned in the work Populism: A Very Short Introduction.
What is populism, first and foremost, a term we throw around easily in battle and generally to designate politicians who want to please the "people"?
Cas Mudde starts from the following working definition: populism is a weakly centered ideology that considers society as divided into two antagonistic parts: the "pure people" versus the "corrupt elites" and argues, therefore, that politics must be an expression of the general will of the people (in Rousseau's sense, where the general will opposes the will of all).
In fact, says Mudde, populism rarely appears on its own, it is malleable and adapts to different forms, depending on the themes of one society or another.
In this definition, populism has two direct opponents: elitism and especially pluralism. It shares with elitism the Manichean vision, us, the good ones, and you, the bad ones, only that elitism sees the people as corrupted by mediocrity, while the elites are superior not only morally but also intellectually and culturally. Pluralism is quite different because it sees diversity as an advantage.
There is also an intersection with a history in Romania: clientelism, where politicians directly buy people's goodwill, whether through direct payments or privileges associated with access to goods and services.
The difference, says Mudde, is that populism is an ideology, whereas clientelism is more of a strategy to gain and exercise political power. It is weaker, therefore, than populism, but more harmful in the short term. All they have in common is that they are indifferent to the difference between left and right.
What are the elements of populism?
The people, the elite, and the general will, these three elements come into play when it comes to populism, says Cas Mudde.
We often hear phrases like "returning to the people," "the sovereign people," "common people," and, in opposition, the political elite, in power.
In Romania, there is no party that does not want to be the representative of ordinary people, of the sovereign people, of the nation. There is no party that, being in opposition, does not claim to give power/governance back to the people: "We take Romania back," thus insinuating the political representation vice of the parties in power.
Much more malignant forms can also appear, such as portraying elites as "enemies" of the country, "sold out to foreign powers," such as the case of Hungarian elites, accused either of being EU lackeys or even agents of Zionism, see the smear campaign against George Soros and, related, the European Union.
Is populism necessarily bad?
The fall of communism led to a generalized sense of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, notes Cas Mudde. In countries where civil society played an important resistance role or even in the fall of communist dictatorship, such as Poland and East Germany, the messages were eminently populist: "we are the people," for example.
In this limited case, we can talk about positive populism, which led to encouraging participation in political decision-making.
But rarely are populists truly authentic outsiders, examples here being Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori. Most of the time, they either come from the system itself or from its proximity: here, one of the examples given by Cas Mudde is that of Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the leader of the far-right Greater Romania Party, a former court poet of dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu.
However, if populism can help in the transition process to democracy, it becomes harmful when it takes root in a democracy and, especially, when fueled by political power.
In this case, says Cas Mudde, populism plays a role in de-democratization, in three stages: democratic erosion, democracy collapse, and, in the end, the repressive system. The first stage means, concretely, undermining the autonomy of institutions that deal with guaranteeing fundamental rights, including institutions of judicial independence, those concerning the rule of law, and those protecting minority rights."