Ever-changing objectives, unclear timelines, and a fragile pretext. At times, the US-Israel campaign against Iran presents bizarre parallels with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Both campaigns were designed differently at different times, yet with dubious claims of defensive action and a strange reluctance to consider them as wars.
It is not an exact comparison because in 2022, Putin sent a massive army across Ukraine’s borders in an unprovoked invasion of a democratic state, a campaign that quickly led to significant losses. In contrast, the United States has largely limited its involvement so far to airstrikes against the authoritarian Iranian regime.
Nevertheless, certain similarities are hard to ignore, as highlighted in an analysis published in The Guardian.
From Initial Objectives to Others
In both wars, the objectives were formulated differently at different times, while the legal justification, experts say, is nonexistent.
The initial statements of the United States framed the attacks as an effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. American administration officials also mentioned the degradation of Iran's missile capabilities and the weakening of the military infrastructure supporting its regional network.
Then, the objectives became increasingly maximalist. Donald Trump stated that the leadership of Iran should be replaced, openly invoking the prospect of regime change and, more recently, demanding the "unconditional surrender" of Tehran.
In Russia's war in Ukraine, the Kremlin also repeatedly changed its stated objectives.
When Putin launched the invasion in February 2022, he said the purpose of the "special military operation" was the "demilitarization and denazification" of Ukraine, language widely interpreted as an effort to change the regime in Kiev. As the war dragged on, the Kremlin increasingly portrayed the conflict as necessary to protect Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine and ensure control over the territories Moscow subsequently annexed.
When Washington and Moscow Speak the Same Language
The similarities are also reflected in the discourse of Washington and Moscow. Both sides presented their actions as defensive, invoking, experts say, dubious claims that they were acting to prevent an imminent threat.
Last week, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the US "did not start this war, but under President Trump, we will finish it."
Throughout his own war, Putin used strikingly similar language. "We did not start the so-called war in Ukraine. We are trying to end it," he said at one point.
Neither of the mentioned leaders expected to be drawn into a protracted conflict. Putin seemed to believe that the large-scale war in Ukraine would last only a few weeks and that he could repeat the swift capture of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, we have reached Day 1476.
Meanwhile, Trump entered the confrontation encouraged by the apparent success of the American operation earlier this year, which resulted in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
Significantly, some American officials and the Kremlin have avoided describing their actions as acts of war, suggesting that they expected this conflict to be short-lived.
Four years after the invasion he triggered, Putin still avoids the term "war," insisting on calling the invasion a "special military operation," an expression he enforced domestically through strict censorship laws that landed opponents in prison.
Some officials in Washington have also been reluctant to use the word "war." Asked last week if US actions constitute a war, House Speaker Mike Johnson replied, "I believe it is a limited operation."
The New Yorker made a joke on this topic, posting an image with Tolstoy's classic novel "War and Peace," in which "War" was replaced with "Limited Battle Operation." Similar jokes appeared four years ago when Russia was supposed to take Kiev in three days.
The System Aligns Behind the Leader
The British newspaper also notes the reaction of political elites and the press in Russia and the US. A large part of the Russian system, initially horrified by the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, eventually supported the war, arguing that Putin should finish what he started.
Some personalities from the anti-war movement in Russia, in exile, rushed to highlight parallels in the reaction to the most recent conflict, noting how American commentators who had vehemently criticized Russia's invasion were struggling to maintain the same clarity when their own country entered a war.
"Once our presidents make the decision to go to war, even when they disagree with the decision and the process—such as in our current war with Iran—they still want our armed forces to win," wrote Michael McFaul, on X, the former US ambassador to Moscow under Barack Obama and a frequent critic of Trump.
The question now is whether the United States can avoid the pitfalls Russia fell into in Ukraine and if more parallels will emerge.
According to press reports, Trump recently discussed the possibility of sending elite troops to Iran to secure Tehran's enriched uranium stocks.
In the early days of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia deployed elite air forces to occupy a key airport near the city of Kiev, a risky operation that resulted in significant losses.
Commenting on the US-Israel campaign, Danny Citrinowicz, a non-resident researcher at the Atlantic Council, warned on Friday that "when strategic objectives become too ambitious or unrealistic, even a successful military campaign can gradually slide into a war of attrition."
"To avoid this outcome, it is essential to define clear and realistic objectives, objectives that can be measured and that provide a clear point at which the campaign can end," he added, in a post on X.
Vladimir Frolov, a retired Russian diplomat, responded curtly: "Sounds familiar."
T.D.