In the last two months, Frenchman Emmanuel Macron, Irishman Micheál Martin, Canadian Mark Carney, Finn Petteri Orpo, and Briton Keir Starmer have traveled to the Chinese capital. German Chancellor Friederich Merz is expected to arrive at the end of this month.
The official visits, largely focused on ensuring greater access to the highly restrictive Chinese market, coincide with a steady increase in transatlantic tensions caused by Washington’s expansive foreign policy.
What Beijing is pursuing without hiding
The fractures have not gone unnoticed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who, every time he receives a dignitary, takes the opportunity to implicitly rebuke Trump and present his country as a staunch defender of multilateralism.
"The international order is under great pressure. International law can truly be effective only when all countries respect it," Xi declared during his meeting with Starmer, according to an official statement that also criticized "unilateralism, protectionism, and power politics."
Beijing does not hide its ultimate goal: to create a rift between the two shores of the Atlantic and further expand its geopolitical influence at America's expense, as stated in an analysis published by Euronews.
Western leaders have reacted positively but cautiously to this proposal, fearing that an excessive show of enthusiasm towards Beijing could draw Trump's anger.
What has irked Macron
For the European Union, the issue of balance is more dangerous.
On one hand, the bloc of 27 member states is desperate to attract new markets to offset the 15% tariff agreed upon in an unbalanced agreement with Trump. As the world's second-largest economy with a growing middle class, China is, at least on paper, an attractive business partner.
But on the other hand, the EU is struggling more than ever to limit the growing trade deficit with China, as Beijing shifts towards low-cost exports to offset a persistent real estate crisis and low consumer demand.
China ended 2025 with a surplus of nearly $1.2 trillion (1 trillion euros), the largest ever recorded by a nation in modern history.
This figure seems to have played a decisive role in Macron's defiant speech at Davos last month. Wearing attention-grabbing aviator sunglasses, the French president denounced China for its "underconsumption" of foreign goods and for its "massive excess capacities and distortionary practices," which "threaten to overwhelm entire industrial and commercial sectors."
Trump came, and everything changed
In a way, Macron's grievances embody the last five years of EU-China relations, notes the source cited.
Starting with the pandemic, a cataclysm that painfully exposed the bloc's dependence on China, European leaders began to adopt, with varying degrees of conviction, a tougher policy towards Beijing.
The position was further strengthened after Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Europeans were horrified to see Xi Jinping reaffirming his "limitless" partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin and supporting his war economy. Soon, circumventing Western sanctions through China became a major source of irritation.
"You can't say you're a reliable partner for the EU if, at the same time, you're facilitating the biggest threat to our security," said a high-ranking diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. "On one hand, we need to collaborate with them on certain issues. On the other hand, they fuel an aggressive war. It's not easy."
Amid extremely high tensions, Ursula von der Leyen, head of the European Commission, coined the term "de-risking" to reduce security vulnerabilities with China and launched several investigations into products manufactured in China suspected of unfair competition, especially electric vehicle batteries.
The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden welcomed the actions and urged Europeans to close ranks and exert pressure on Beijing. But then Trump was reelected, and everything changed overnight.
China, needlessly threatened with a bazooka
European officials assumed that the economic challenges posed by China's economy, openly denounced by Trump during his campaign, would serve as a political glue to keep both sides of the Atlantic somewhat aligned. However, Trump never established a consistent policy towards China, oscillating between confrontation, conciliation, and praise in a rhythm that bewildered European capitals.
Following Trump's "reciprocal tariffs," European leaders softened their rhetoric towards China and fueled speculation about a diplomatic reset after years of clashes.
However, hopes for a reset were shattered when Beijing, as part of its confrontation with the White House, imposed strict restrictions on exports of rare earths, crucial metallic elements for advanced technologies. China accounts for about 60% of global production and 90% of processing and refining capacity.
The restrictions had a paralyzing effect on the European industry, with some factories forced to reduce working hours and postpone orders. Outrage immediately escalated: von der Leyen attacked China for its "dominance model, dependency, and blackmail."
The President of the European Commission flew to Beijing in July for a streamlined EU-China summit, which yielded preliminary progress on facilitating the supply of rare earths. The agreement collapsed in October when Beijing, in another shocking move, extended controls over rare earths.
However, the Commission refrained from retaliation. The EU's anti-coercion tool, the so-called "commercial bazooka" designed with China in mind, was never put on the table for serious discussion. Pushed aside and adrift, Europeans watched as Trump struck a deal with Xi to lift restrictions, benefiting all countries worldwide.
Europe is cautious with China
The Chinese leadership has shown willingness to activate and lift restrictions based on its foreign policy objectives, raising serious concerns about their transformation into weapons. The prospect of new controls weakened Brussels' resolve to start new conflicts with Beijing, at least for now. While Macron has openly expressed his dissatisfaction, others prefer to tread lightly.
At this year's World Economic Forum in Davos, von der Leyen made only one reference to the country in her main speech. Merz mentioned China only once in his Davos speech.
The same caution marked the recent round of high-level European visits to Beijing. Escorted by carefully selected business representatives, leaders put controversial political issues on the back burner in favor of commercial opportunities.
Why everyone is turning to China
These commitments must be understood in the context of the shockwaves sent worldwide by Trump, whose actions offered China an invaluable opportunity, according to Alicia García-Herrero, a senior researcher at the Brussels-based expert group Bruegel.
"Everyone is turning to China because they genuinely fear the U.S., and this must be understood," García-Herrero said for the cited post.
In her view, despite criticisms of Trump, Europeans are not ready to throw themselves into China's arms because they still believe that Beijing has a dubious stance: it aids Russia, does nothing about industrial overcapacity, and imposes export controls on European companies.
Europeans are not united, and that's what Beijing is waiting for
The consecutive visits, which Brussels insists are coordinated, highlight a fundamental feature that has long characterized EU-China relations: lack of unity.
As the 27 member states are unable to agree on a common policy for managing the Asian giant, each of them conducts diplomatic relations with it on a bilateral level to pursue sometimes divergent interests. These divergences hinder strategic discussions and blur long-term thinking at the European level. EU leaders have practically ceased to address China as a singular entity when they personally meet for high-level summits, and Foreign Ministers only do so occasionally.
Nevertheless, challenges persist, as demonstrated by China's one trillion euro trade surplus.
After the difficult ups and downs of last year, 2026 will be defined by a challenging balancing act for Europe: strengthening European economic security in the face of the US and China, while trying not to "rock the boat too much," says Alicja Bachulska, a researcher in public policy at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
"Europeans seem paralyzed in the face of challenges to their security - both harsh and economic - coming from both Beijing and Washington, so the desire to make bold and potentially costly decisions is limited," she said.
"Meanwhile, the clock is ticking, and Europe should understand that there will be costs of inaction towards Beijing, such as progressive deindustrialization and an even greater dependence on value chains dominated by China."
T.D.