Romania has been in a political crisis for almost 5 months, and on Wednesday, in Parliament, a second vote will take place to validate a prime minister after Ilie Bolojan was dismissed through a vote of no confidence.
In this tense context, in the second episode of the „Controversies” podcast, I found it useful to discuss with my colleague about a strong sensation present in Romanian society, expressed by many publicly or in private discussions, that of a return to an increasingly strict control of society, reminiscent of what some felt in the final years of the Ceausescu regime – the omnipresence of intelligence services.
Corruption, lack of transparency in political decisions, faulty communication, and institutional failures in recent years have shattered people’s trust in authorities, leading to a widespread suspicion throughout society.
Against the backdrop of the long-standing border war and the hybrid attacks carried out by Russia across the entire continent, Romania has proven to be weak, unprepared, and led by mediocre leaders. As a result, discussions about the opaque involvement of intelligence services in politics, media, business, and justice have become increasingly common, intensifying people's confusion and distrust.
Patriotism validated by services
But when did the intelligence services in Romania start to be perceived again as a major player in decision-making in the state, in a hidden manner and without being held accountable in case of failure?
Most likely, from a historical perspective, the return of "securitism" in society began around 2004, when Romania joined NATO and embarked on the path towards joining the European Union.
During that period, in the final moments of Ion Iliescu's mandate and the beginning of Traian Basescu's mandate, there was a fear among the power circles in Bucharest that the country's opening to the West would come with a loss of influence and control over the political class, business, and society in general.
At that time, the idea emerged that leaders from all fields should be validated by "patriots" from intelligence services, through studies within militarized academies.
Once the door was opened, involvement increased more and more, making it difficult today to distinguish a politician from an intelligence agent, with civilian control over this domain being annulled.
We discussed all these topics and many more together with journalist Matei Udrea in the second episode of the "Controversies" podcast, which can be watched here and on the publication's YouTube channel.
We aim to release a new episode every week, with interesting and original content, presenting and analyzing what is happening in Romania and the world.
Also, check out the first episode - Nicușor Dan and the issue of civilian control: "If you don't make decisions, others will make them for you" - Controversies, podcast with Matei Udrea and Emilian Isailă
Important Quotes:
"The major problem for those making plans in the political system arises when they step out of the political sphere and try to work under the table. At that moment, they turn to all sorts of people: reservists, priests, intelligence service personnel, people bringing money from Moscow. And they enter a turbulent zone that they no longer control."
"As long as those in the intelligence services view civilian control as a burden, something that hinders rather than helps them, reform is impossible. You have given them power, and who wants to give up power?"
"If even today recruitment for intelligence services is still done through military schools, then someone is not right in the head. You cannot fight against artificial intelligence, social networks, and Russia's influence using people trained in marching step."
"You give more power to these people because they fight against the Russians. But they come from the national-communist, Ceausescuist area, and think like Putin. They have a caste vision, like Chekists. Precisely because of this past and this education, they are very easy to catch and manipulate: they think the same way as the adversary."
"The concept that we must appease everyone, sit on the fence, seems toxic to Romania's security. That's why everyone wonders why Romania doesn't take a stand, why it doesn't ask for anything. Because we work under the table, so that no one sees us and we don't create problems."
7 main ideas
- "Securitate-ism," a national trauma. The lack of transparency of the services fuels conspiracy theories. However, since 1990, no real reform has been carried out. Securitate members have been "recycled" into businesspeople, politicians, and the new services, following the Russian model.
- The Securitate split. After Ceausescu refused to invade Czechoslovakia, the Securitate split into two camps: one controlled by the Kremlin and one nationalist, created by Ceausescu to oversee the "Kremlinists." In 1989, the Kremlin camp won, and SRI and SIE were built by its people (Caraman, Măgureanu).
- 1997–2007, the window of detachment from Moscow. This is the decade when Romania was least connected to the Kremlin and made the most significant institutional steps towards joining NATO and the EU.
- 2008, reactivation of networks. After the NATO summit in Bucharest, Moscow reactivates its dormant networks. Reconnection first occurs through politicians, not through services.
- The Iohannis-services pact and the rise of sovereigntism. In the political battle of 2017–2018, Iohannis restores privileges to the services. In the same context, AUR emerges, and the sovereignist movement only starts with the pandemic.
- The reservists-religion pincer movement. Kremlin reconnects with services through reservist groups, then through religious networks: the Coalition for Family and old informant priests. This becomes the infrastructure for Călin Georgescu and AUR.
- The solution that deepens the problem. The political class gives more and more power to intelligence agencies to fight the Russian offensive. However, these services have leadership with a national-communist mindset, weak civilian control, and recruitment from military schools. The national security strategy is not implemented, leading to systematic failure.