Twenty-five years after the terrorist attacks that changed the world, the United States continues to face the same „perfect storm” fueled by stifling bureaucracy, political correctness, and diplomatic illusions, notes an American analyst.
The terrorists who hijacked planes on September 11, 2001, were neither poor nor subjected to occupation. Yet, the idea that dissatisfaction fuels terrorism survived. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence Office slowed down the flow of information it was created to accelerate. And U.S. allies continue to play both sides, writes Michael Rubin, a senior researcher at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, in an analysis published by 1945.com.
The most concerning change he identifies has occurred within the U.S.: after September 11, Americans briefly showed unity, while today an attacker could justifiably expect division.
Twenty-five years after the events of September 11, 2001, the same "perfect storm" fueled by stifling bureaucracy, political correctness, and diplomatic illusions persists, notes Rubin, a former Pentagon official.
The Same Pattern Today
Al-Qaida's attacks sounded an alarm about the power of ideology as a motivator for terrorism.
Prior to September 11, many diplomats and social scientists believed that grievances fueled terrorism. They argued that the issue stemmed from poverty, lack of education, or the "occupation" humiliation. President George W. Bush tried to bypass this issue through the "Global War on Terror," essentially declaring war on a tactic, not an idea, the analyst explains.
The September 11 attacks forced Americans to reassess their own mistaken assumptions. The authors of the hijackings were neither poor nor living under occupation.
Meanwhile, the establishment of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Office slowed down the information flow, instead of addressing the fundamental process flaws.
A cumbersome bureaucracy blocked information about Saudi trainees uninterested in learning to land, and both the White House and the State Department tried to shield the Saudi side from inquiries or criticism.
Today, the same pattern recurs.
President Barack Obama adopted the conclusions of accredited academics who argued that any focus on Islam as a motivating factor was an act of Islamophobia.
The irony of this politically correct revisionism lies in the fact that decision-makers in the Middle East did not exhibit such sensitivity; they understood that the issue was actually a debate within Islam. Simply put, theology matters, the author points out.
The Complicated Friendship with Prince Mohammed bin Salman
While a generation of diplomats praises Saudi reforms, reality speaks for itself.
Saudi authorities took drastic measures against internal radicalism not because of the events of September 11, but rather when faced with direct negative repercussions.
The West applauds bin Salman's reforms, ignoring the double game the Saudi leader plays regarding the Muslim Brotherhood. Like his Saudi predecessors, he seeks to co-opt extremists through a "pact with the devil": they are to carry out their jihad only for export.
Bin Salman's Mecca Pact initiative – a sort of Sunni NATO currently comprising Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, with Bangladesh, Egypt, and Syria preparing to join – suggests that Saudi Arabia is not a sincere partner but rather the cornerstone of a new "Axis."
The Danger from Turkey, Pakistan, and Syria
A similar situation is found with Turkey and Pakistan. Turkey is a NATO member, and Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally.
President Donald Trump supports both, despite their undeniable support for terrorism and anti-American stance. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly embraces Hamas and, more discreetly, supports both the Taliban and the Islamic State group, Rubin writes.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has played a double game in its relationship with the Taliban, harbored bin Laden, and continues to support a range of terrorist groups that, while officially targeting India, are equally hostile to the United States.
While Trump dines with Pakistani Marshal Asim Munir, those who killed American citizens in the Mumbai attacks remain at large.
Cultivating close relationships with Turkish and Pakistani leaders, despite their statements and actions, would be akin to Franklin Roosevelt conducting business and socializing with leaders from Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, deliberately ignoring not only their worldview but also their efforts to implement it through violence, the expert emphasizes.
Regarding Syria, illusions dictate events. Trump ordered the rehabilitation of Ahmad al-Sharaa, despite his years of leading an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group.
Yet, a sharp suit and a well-groomed beard do not equate to reform or remorse. Even if al-Sharaa is sincere, those within the movement keeping him in power are not, the expert points out.
A New and More Frightening September 11
Based on these developments, Michael Rubin estimates that the next September 11 could involve not only Saudi students or businessmen but also Turkish, Pakistani, Syrian, or Bangladeshi officials who would use diplomatic pouches to avoid detection while transporting contraband.
Perhaps the most alarming change in the past 25 years is the legitimization and justification, within intellectual circles, of the factors that underpinned the events of September 11, he believes.
Instead of recognizing the terrorists' ideology as a constant and understanding the cynical nature of their grievances in their latest statements, elite universities – as well as journalists and analysts trained by them – adopt the idea of moral equivalence, shifting blame onto U.S. foreign policy, India, or Israel.
While it is unlikely that their own citizens would be willing suicide bombers, the Qatari government is more than happy to fund those who are.
If Americans briefly united after the events of September 11, today terrorists realize that the political climate in America is so toxic that a major attack could more likely divide the population than unite it.
As Americans mark a somber event, this is perhaps the most troubling change in the last quarter-century, concludes Michael Rubin.
T.D.