To step out of a comfort zone regarding the monitoring of political processes, I decided that, in order to evaluate the negotiations of the Cotroceni Palace with MAGA over the past year, I would speak with a political analyst much younger than me, who was not born under communism and who has demonstrated expertise in recent years, as well as remarkable performance in communicating with his generation.
Representative quotes:
- We could have looked more towards the European Union and been more active within it, instead of criticizing it so much and undermining Europeans’ trust in us. We should seek there the things that would help us.
- I think it was time to realize that if the United States is no longer the strategic partner we can rely on through thick and thin, we need to turn to the European Union and say what we want from its future.
- Our current leaders are so distrustful of the Romanian state’s ability to deliver and defend itself, probably scared by the lack of administrative capacity, that they are willing to accept very, very many compromises to ensure the country’s security.
- I have not seen Maia Sandu humiliate herself as it seems the Romanian administration has: relations with all kinds of emissaries of Trump, instant phone responses all the time, agreements signed, rushing to participate in various initiatives, such as the Board of Peace.
Răzvan Petri, 26 years old, is the co-founder of the online platform, “Politics in a Minute”, which has a great impact on Instagram, where the account has around 200,000 followers.
He graduated from the Faculty of Political Science at King’s College and holds a master’s degree in public policy from UCL, two prestigious universities in the United Kingdom.
How do you see Romania’s presidency strategy in relation to the United States?
It seems to me that we have put all our eggs in the same basket. It has been mentioned in the public sphere, but it is important to emphasize: Romania continues to operate on theoretical schemes, on an understanding of the world that has not been valid for about ten years and should have been updated.
For example, the belief that the United States has the same priorities and the same strategy for Europe and, consequently, for Eastern Europe, and that everything is like in the ’90s–2000s, when we were at Fukuyama’s “end of history”: liberal democracy won, and all we have to do is enjoy the American military presence and the benefits of joining the European Union. This is no longer valid because the world has changed. And the administration practically does not want to accept this change.
America remains the most powerful country in the world, militarily and economically. I agree that the strategy is outdated and that pulling on Trump’s sleeve is not the smartest solution. But what else could the Romanian president have done?
Absolutely, America remains the most powerful. What he could have done is use resources—time, financial and others—to ensure that we are not left exposed in the situation we are in now.
First of all, he could have used these resources, or part of them, to build bridges with the Democrats: to inform them and be in constant contact regarding Romania’s interests in the region.
We know that the Democrats will probably control Congress not only for the next two years but maybe for a longer period, because in the next midterm elections, votes will be cast in states favorable to them.
It was necessary to make them aware of our area. Especially since none of the three camps currently discussed in the Democratic Party – the revolutionaries, the reformists, and the old guard, which wants a return to the pre-Trump era – is necessarily interested in this region anymore.
Secondly, we could have looked more towards the European Union and been more active within it, instead of criticizing it so much and undermining Europeans’ trust in us. We should seek there the things that would help us.
So you’re saying we should have focused more on strengthening relations with the major EU states – France, Germany – and even with the United Kingdom, which is not in the Union?
Exactly. And not just in bilateral relations, but also through Brussels. The problem is that Romania is not necessarily underrepresented in the European Union, but it is not adequately represented.
We are the sixth largest country in the Union, we have the sixth largest delegation, we have a vice-presidency in the European Commission. Fine, but this representation is not reflected in the negotiated acts, in our desires and objectives reflected in European legislation.
We lack direction and vision. We don’t really express ourselves about the direction the European Union should take. We are more followers; we go after the big players. And this contributes to the feeling among Romanians – and it becomes an internal political problem – that we receive orders from Brussels. Because we say “yes” to anything that comes from there.
I think it was time to realize that if the United States is no longer the strategic partner we can rely on through thick and thin, we need to turn to the European Union and say what we want from its future. Do we want a European army? Do we want a European pillar of NATO? Do we want to complete the single market?
To also praise Nicușor Dan, it’s good that we mobilize for cohesion, because Romania still needs serious cohesion funds. But that’s not enough.
I would also look at the energy market and the green transition, which is not an ideological whim, as Nicușor Dan tends to say, but a matter of strategic autonomy.
We can no longer depend on gas from the Americans, the Russians, or anywhere else – neither for heating nor for industry. We should rather electrify and view the green area as an energy security policy.
And I would look at the defense industry. Romania has advocated for the United States to be better represented in the SAFE program, and for the American industry to have greater access to it. This has weakened the idea that we should build a European defense industry that could free us from dependence on American technology and, in fact, from the whims of Washington.
Why do you think the current administration in Bucharest, led by Nicușor Dan, bet on this deal-making with Trump’s people instead of developing the relationship with the European Union?
I don’t think there is a single cause. On one hand, it relates to the personal beliefs of those in the administration, Nicușor Dan and Marius Lazurca, who both tend to be more conservative, thus ideologically closer to the Republican Party as a structure.
But they didn’t make deals with the Republican Party. They worked with Trump’s people – with Zampolli, Trump Jr., Guilfoyle. Where is the Republican Party in all this?
What I was trying to say is that they were predisposed to work with the conservative camp anyway. Now, the Republican Party, being dominated by MAGA, the movement built by Trump and the people he brought in – people accused of pimping, corruption, and many other things – they said to themselves: “Fine, we have to work with them for Romania’s interests.”
Here comes a second argument, which they also invoke publicly: we have to hold our noses and work with these people, even if they are not the nicest or the best. We sit at the table with anyone for the national interest. Nicușor Dan has even said it: I don’t have to like my interlocutor, but sometimes I have to talk to him to reach a compromise, to get what I want.
And what have they achieved so far by holding their noses?
I don’t think they have achieved much. I still leave a little room for skepticism. Maybe there are things we don’t know. Maybe it could have been much worse, and what they have achieved is maintaining the status quo. Knowing more behind the scenes – things that are not told to us, although I think they should be – they can say: we maintained the status quo, the Americans did not withdraw, we did not enter into conflict with Washington, so it is a victory.
However, I believe we should not be satisfied with such a victory.
Let’s look at it differently: if we hadn’t done all these things, could something worse have happened?
It may sound controversial, but I don't believe it could have been worse. I look at examples of some countries in the region that have not humiliated themselves as much in their relationship with the United States.
For example, Hungary, where the regime changed, although we know how strong Viktor Orbán's relationship with Trump was. Did the Americans take revenge on Hungary?
They did not take revenge. Hungary is a good example, but I think I have an even better one: a smaller, more exposed country that is neither in the EU nor NATO and which had every reason to stick close to the United States – the Republic of Moldova. I haven't seen Maia Sandu humiliate herself as it seems the Romanian administration has: relations with all sorts of Trump emissaries, instant phone responses at all times, agreements signed, eagerness to participate in various initiatives, such as the Board of Peace.
That was not the case with Moldova, even though, according to the logic of our presidential administration, it had more reasons to seek good relations with Washington.
So there is no American revenge if you have an attitude other than crawling on your knees. Then why is there bent-over negotiating with Trump’s people?
I don't believe there is negotiating. From discussions with people who have been or are in the administration and from what I have seen in the press, I have formed the opinion that our current leaders are so distrustful of the Romanian state's capacity to deliver, to defend itself, so probably scared of the lack of administrative capacity, that they are willing to accept very, very many compromises to ensure the country's security.
They consider the United States the main guarantor of Romania's security. And for them, this guarantee is paramount: security comes first, only then can we turn to economic development, modernization, and reforms. They are willing to make compromises until they reach step two. I think this lack of negotiation and acceptance of anything coming from Washington should be read this way.
Of course, I am not inside the administration. But I think there is too much fear there and too little political imagination and ambition – exactly what we would need to negotiate as equals, as two sovereign states that have both common interests and divergent interests.
Now it seems we have ended up between a rock and a hard place. Those we "negotiated" with lost the elections, and with those coming to power in January 2027 we have no points of contact – I don't know if anyone has spoken with Talarico or others who won the Senate. On one side, we have people paid through the lobbying contract, with decreasing influence; on the other, people we haven't spoken to. What comes next?
That is the million-point question. My opinion is that things will not change very much. Despite the fact that we have put so much emphasis on MAGA and have tried so hard to get noticed, I believe American policy in the region will not change drastically, no matter what we do.
Of course, we need to talk to the Democrats; it's good for them to know what we are doing and maybe we can mitigate the impact of some decisions.
Why do you think American policy in the region will not change, regardless of who is in power?
Because the current situation is the result of structural changes in American politics, caused by things neither the Democrats nor the Republicans control. Very high public debt. The American public's feeling that the US has focused too much abroad, got involved in too many wars, and paid too little attention to domestic problems. Political changes – the wave coming into the Democratic Party as a reaction to the transformation of the Republican Party. And, finally, the new global competition.
The United States is now much more interested in what is happening in China than in what is happening in Europe. The pivot to Asia did not start now but with Obama. Now the urgency is greater because Trump, Biden, Democrats, and Republicans have identified roughly the same problems for the United States. Russia remains, of course, on the radar, but it is not considered an existential threat to American supremacy, as China is.