Hungary is at the end of the road; there we have only alternatives like exiting NATO or the European Union, very, very dramatic alternatives: I think it would be good for Romania not to reach these dilemmas, is the warning of Italian historian Stefano Bottoni.
Mr. Georgescu represents a more specific Romanian element, the intersection between legionarism and Ceausescuism. When I started researching from the archives in Romania, 20 years ago, I heard many times in the country the expression that a person is a legionary at heart and I was very surprised at how strong this legionary sentiment is. This means that it does not have a political home, it does not have a political alternative, and now these legionaries at heart have found a political country where they can live. This legionarism from the 1930s intersected very interestingly with Ceausescuism and with the power of the secret services after 1989, says Bottoni, in an interview given to spotmedia.ro.
If the votes of Georgescu and those of Simion and others reach 40 percent, we have a sovereigntist bloc from Romania, which would be comparable to that in Hungary, from an electoral point of view. And I think this is very well regarded in Budapest, because it is a signal of weakness of the liberal West.
Stefano Bottoni
Stefano Bottoni is a lecturer at the University of Florence, where he teaches Eastern European history and universal history. His main research area is politics towards minorities and interethnic relations in the Soviet bloc. His volume „The Genius of Pannonia”. The Orbán Project and the Illiberal Threat is forthcoming from Humanitas Publishing House.
Stefano Bottoni, our dialogue is triggered by the appearance in Romanian of a political biography of Viktor Orbán. A formidable political biography, which has a part specifically written for the Romanian public and a special title for Romania, The Genius of Pannonia. How did Viktor Orbán manage to create a power regime so specific, he is called illiberal. What are the key elements of the Viktor Orbán power regime?
Viktor Orbán's secret has a comparative dimension. We can talk about the crisis of democracy in the peripheries of Europe. Here comes a more general disappointment towards the European Union, towards the so-called collective West, as Russian President Vladimir Putin calls it.
Many politicians and businessmen have built a political career on this social disappointment. But I think in Hungary we have a historical dimension, a particular situation, and the intellectual capacities of Viktor Orbán. Viktor Orbán is a figure of intellectual stature, I believe, not comparable to other politicians in Eastern Europe who have emerged in recent decades.
Viktor Orbán is the man who promises Great Hungary, but not territorially, and promises a better future than the past. The 20th century was a century in which Hungary lost. Viktor Orbán and FIDESZ promised Hungarians that they would win together; it is a revanchist ideology towards the past, towards those who conquered Hungary, those who considered Hungary a semi-periphery, a colony. Viktor Orbán also has a decolonialist part, from this point of view.
It is very interesting, because Viktor Orbán comes from the liberal and anti-communist tradition. In my book, I tried to show that this change occurred slowly, step by step, and it is not an inexplicable process. Viktor Orbán did not go crazy at one point, I believe he made decisions very rationally, when he became conservative, when he became even more conservative or even reactionary after 2010, when he took power with an overwhelming majority, changed the Constitution, and created the National Cooperation System, as he calls it.
He cynically chose, made a cynical calculation, because he had lost power before and now he was determined to regain it in the long term?
Yes, and at any cost. And the price was democracy.
Currently, we have an interesting comparative element in Romania at this moment. Ordinary Hungarians were not very interested in the fate of post-communist Hungarian democracy from 2010 onwards when they voted for Viktor Orbán, and 20% of voters voted in 2010 for Jobbik, which was a much more radical alternative.
We had a situation in 2010 when almost three-quarters of the Hungarian electorate voted for parties that no longer believed in the so-called post-communist democracy, the liberal democracy after 1989. They no longer believed that this democracy, which was not working very well, could be fixed and they accepted this change.
And when the negative consequences of this change came, conflicts with the European Union, soft authoritarianism, and then, a little less soft, they did not massively take to the streets to protest, they did not react firmly and immediately.
And I think it is a lesson for Romania: when authoritarianism comes or when authoritarianism shows up at the door, if there is a strong popular, social, societal reaction, many things do not happen or would only happen with the use of force. Viktor Orbán has achieved what he has achieved in Hungary, practically without physical violence. It is a very different model from the model of Putin in Russia or Lukashenko in Belarus. It is a Euro-compatible model, which has proven to be Euro-compatible for many years or decades.
Currently, Romania has this choice, with a democracy to be repaired, which, like a car that has not been repaired for 10 years, is running poorly. But the choice is to try to fix it or throw it away, as happened in Hungary.
You mentioned that Viktor Orbán wanted a power regime, at any cost. Besides this cost, democracy, which may sound theoretical to some, what other price did Hungary pay? What are the consequences in people's lives?
In my view, the worst consequence is not economic underdevelopment. It is a major consequence, because Hungary was a relatively developed country in the 2000s, when it joined the European Union it was more developed than Slovakia, more developed than Croatia, more developed than Poland, than the Baltic countries. But, in my view, the more serious, more embarrassing consequence is the mental state of the country.
A country that is part of the EU, of a Euro-Atlantic alliance, but maintains a double position and plays with its enemies, with Russia.
Viktor Orbán calls it a position of strategic neutrality. But this strategic neutrality does not exist in today's international politics, in the midst of war and amid global conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war between Russia and Ukraine.
Hungary is part of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, but with a mental state detached from the so-called collective West, while hundreds of thousands of Hungarians work and live in the West, experiencing the daily reality of the West and hundreds of thousands of Hungarians commute between Budapest and Vienna or Munich or other regions close to Austria, Germany, Italy. I think it is something very, very bad, because the social consensus that existed that Hungary's future is part of the West has been broken.
Hungary is the periphery of the West and it is better in terms of the country's interests. It is better to be part of the West, in the peripheral position, than to be part of another space about which we know almost nothing, which can be very mystical and very fascinating intellectually, but does not belong to us. It is not a problem of superiority, but very practically it is a fact that Hungary is in Central Europe and belongs to a historical space that has interferences with the West.
I found it powerful in the book that Viktor Orbán almost managed to create a new society. You talk about this altered mental state, a new man I would say, but at a social level. Was this intentional from the start?
I believe processes of intellectual radicalization of a regime are not always planned. I don't think Viktor Orbán planned step by step the radicalization of his regime. I think he planned one thing before returning to power, he planned that this time he would stay in power for a long time.
Hungary's belonging to the Western cultural and political sphere was assumed as a natural fact. But major crises intervened, the financial crisis of 2011-2012, when Viktor Orbán used the weapon of financial sovereignty, which became an instrument of power and also became a moment of the cultural decolonization of the country.
The second moment was the migration crisis of 2015, when Orbán became an internationally significant politician and presented himself as a defender of traditional Europe, defender of traditional values, of Christian, white Europe. Viktor Orbán idealized the Europe of the past and turned it into a political project, becoming an international actor and an influencer on a global scale.
Later, Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump came. Let's not forget that in the summer of 2016 Viktor Orbán was the first prime minister and politician in power in the Western world to openly support Donald Trump for the presidency of the United States of America, when Trump's chances of winning were perceived as zero.
And the last step from this point of view was Russia's war against Ukraine, because Viktor Orbán distanced himself from NATO, of which Hungary is a part. He is an informal ally of Russia, in terms of media, information, public opinion.
You are not satisfied with the explanations given for why Viktor Orbán still made this very large turn towards Putin and Russia. You talk about a few hypotheses. One is the famous compromise hypothesis, when we say Russia we first think of that. The second reason is economic, business as usual, realpolitik. The third explanation is that he wanted to copy Putin's power regime, he admires him for what he has achieved.
It could also be a combination of these factors.
We do not know for sure, and it is embarrassing for me as a historian that we do not have clear evidence. There is a thesis that there might be compromising material about him in Moscow, and this compromising material might have been suggested by Vladimir Putin in their first face-to-face meeting, in November 2009, in St. Petersburg.
We have the fact that the Russian businesses of the socialist elites have been transferred, with all the benefits, to a new elite, the party elite, the elite linked to Viktor Orbán.
And we also have a more profound ideological factor, a kind of admiration for the way Vladimir Putin built what seemed to him a strong, sovereign state, an actor in international politics, with a level of repression that did not seem too high.
I believe that the resurgence of Russia has inspired both ideologues and those around Viktor Orbán, because it is a project very close to the political culture of Hungary after the 1990s: "We almost died, we did very poorly with Trianon, with the Second World War, with communism, and with the regime change in 1989, which was capitalized on and monopolized by former communists. And now our moment has come. Now is the moment of revenge." Putin was also perceived as the man offering hope for those who do not want to be just a periphery of Europe.
We always talk about the political technologies of the Kremlin. I think this political technology has taken on a global dimension.
We have seen now what happened in Romania. A nearly unknown politician campaigns only on a social network, with insignificant funds and an algorithm working for him, achieving very good results and having a chance for the presidency of the country. It is something unimaginable 10 or 20 years ago.
Is this a warning signal? I have spoken before and said that Romania's luck lies somewhat in something paradoxical. We did not have a leader of the intellectual caliber of Viktor Orbán, so to speak: the mediocrity of the political leaders saved us. Do you think we are now in greater danger? Because Mr. Călin Georgescu also has a secure intellectual discourse, in the interwar, Legionnaire sense, from the late Ceaușescu era. But he also poses as an intellectual.
I believe that Mr. Georgescu represents a more specific Romanian element, the intersection between Legionarism and Ceaușescuism. When I started researching the archives in Romania 20 years ago, I heard many times in the country the expression that a person is a Legionnaire at heart, and I was very surprised at how strong this Legionnaire sentiment is. This means that they do not have a political home, they do not have a political alternative, and now these Legionnaires at heart have found a political home.
This Legionarism from the 1930s has intersected very interestingly with Ceaușescuism and with the power of the secret services after 1989, creating an intersection between the '30s, the '70s, and the present time.
This gentleman represents a very good mix in terms of efficiency, between authoritarian sentiments and negative feelings towards Western liberal democracy.
I am not a political analyst from Romania, but I believe that the Orthodox Church is also a factor that cannot be overlooked in this regard. Hungary, as you know, is a multi-denominational country, and a significant part of the population is not religiously affiliated. In Romania, the Orthodox Church is a kind of informal state church. If the Orthodox Church has an opinion, this opinion matters a lot, even more than we imagined.
Do you recognize signals of political technology, how did it work? Have political technologies worked in Budapest to create alternative realities, so to speak?
Yes, I believe it is a case to study. It is an action, let's say, "multi-level," on multiple levels. We have a major party, FIDESZ, which has won at least 30 percent of Hungarian votes since 1998, for almost 30 years. It is a remarkable electoral continuity.
At least 1.5 - 2 million Hungarians, more than a quarter of the electorate, vote for Viktor Orbán, regardless of anything. A totally loyal electorate.
And there are another 1-1.5 million people who can be convinced. There are also 3-4 million who have never voted for him, but they do not count. Society has been artificially divided between the loyal and those who are enemies of the nation, i.e., followers of Soros, liberals, etc.
They are not part of the political society, they do not matter at all. They have a small representation in Parliament, in a Parliament completely emptied of its functions. The Parliament now only has a function of approving decrees and laws proposed by the Government. This is a global trend, but in Hungary, we have now reached a governance through decrees, since the COVID period in 2020, when this trend intensified.
We have propaganda through mass media. As you know, in 2007-2010, a foundation called KESMA was created, which includes more than 400 media products: television, radio, online sites, newspapers, weeklies, with integrated content. What does integrated content mean? It means that through the Hungarian news agency MTI, which is the only one in the market, and through the directives coming from the Prime Minister's Office, from such and such section, we have equal content.
That is, the messages of Power are spread equally textually on any given day. The texts are exactly the same throughout the country, in newspapers, weeklies, on radio, TV, online news portals, and so on. It is remarkable how things have unfolded in such a way that journalists are reduced to a copy-paste function of the messages of power.
We also have the highest level in terms of technology and intellect, an institution like MCC, the Mathias Corvinus College, which is a foundation for higher education, advanced training, established in the '90s, an old institution that functioned absolutely honorably until 5-6 years ago when it was transformed into a powerful propaganda tool.
And now we have this institution spread across several countries, we have it in Romania as well, in the beautiful former Hotel Belvedere in Cluj, and there are such institutions in several cities in Transylvania. With 2,000 students of all levels, from primary school to university and post-university courses, with conferences on topics in history, sociology, music, from many fields.
Is it a kind of school for developing cadres?
Yes, it is a cadre school, but what is very interesting is that those in Transylvania have many guests from Hungary, but also from Romania. Romanian professors, something that is not at all common for a Hungarian nationalist institution in Transylvania, to have an interethnic dialogue there, so to speak. With lectures given in Romanian.
My opinion is the following: Viktor Orbán understood a very important thing, which his enemies or adversaries did not understand. Neither in Hungary nor at the European level did they understand that the difference is no longer ethnic, but one of values.
The Hungarian nationalists now have more in common with nationalists from Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Poland, on topics like the so-called traditional family, gender/transgender discussions, than on traditional issues like the First or Second World War, Trianon, etc.
Well, there are still conflicts, because nationalists always have conflicts about historical facts and their interpretation. But the vision of the future or the vision of a possible future, this is the more important element now.
You say it is a kind of operation to expand the autocratic family? That it is a very important stake here and that practically we are in a process where the illiberal family gathers followers?
Yes, and it is done very, very pragmatically. For example, with Romanians, they no longer talk about Trianon or talk very rarely. They talk about business, about gas pipelines, or about the Black Sea. They also talk about traditional values, about decolonizing minds and the decolonization of European semi-peripheries, about mental independence.
I believe that, from this point of view, Viktor Orbán is the one who initiated this process and created a network. I wrote in the book that since the 1990s, he has approached leaders like Franjo Tudjman, who was the President of Croatia. A very controversial figure, for a certain part of Croatian society, he is the creator and hero of modern Croatia, for others, he is a war criminal.
Maybe he is both things at the same time, I don't know. Or, in Austria, with Jörg Heider, the leader of the FPO who won the elections in 1999 and formed a government with the People's Party and was the first leader from the radical right to reach government for a short period.
Now it seems almost normal, they now have the extreme right back in power. Germany is not doing very well either, if we look at the states.
Exactly, so Viktor Orbán immediately invited him to Budapest, causing a major scandal.
At that time, Orbán was in government in Budapest, in liberal-conservative positions, officially speaking, but Hungary was not a member of the European Union, it was only a candidate for accession. So Orbán defied Brussels. This continued defiance of European institutions is typical of Orbán.
Why do you think Viktor Orbán wanted to be the one to resolve Romania's and Bulgaria's entry into Schengen? Because it is clear that he wanted to take credit for this, because everything happened in Budapest, he issued the press release.
For two reasons. One is pragmatic, many people and goods commute between the two countries, and if you go to Vama Borș or between Szeged and Arad, on the highway, you see how embarrassing the situation is.
Hungarians do not like this situation, to be the guardians of Schengen. Let's not forget that Romania was, technically, ready to join Schengen since 2011. This was promised in January 2011. I am older and I remember this very well, at that time I was a commuter between the two countries and was waiting for Schengen like a sign from heaven, which did not come.
The second motivation is, I believe, that Orbán used Schengen as an instrument of pressure and moral persuasion on Bucharest and Sofia.
Above all on Bucharest, that is, look, you have to be friends with us, we are the ones who help you, we are the ones who can be useful to you regarding Brussels. And that's what happened. Objectively speaking, the Dutch, Germans, or Austrians did everything they could to block Romania's access. For their own reasons, but sometimes with pathetic motivations. Hungary supported this effort and I think it used these two instruments in a combined way.