The discussion about the suspension of Klaus Iohannis is strictly an electoral agitation meant to exploit to the maximum a real political vulnerability of the current coalition in view of the upcoming elections in May. Otherwise, not only would it not solve anything, but it would cause significant damage.
And, since it is a parliamentary initiative, the area where AUR has the first voice also represents a lever for settling political scores between George Simion and Călin Georgescu.
In fact, the suspension process could start at the beginning of the next parliamentary session, on February 1, as the "suspenders" have not managed to convene an extraordinary session.
If we consider the exact terms from the suspension of the president in 2012, on February 1, the suspension document would be submitted to Parliament, on February 3, the CCR would give its advisory opinion, and on the same day, the suspension would be voted on in Parliament.
According to the 2012 calendar, the recall referendum, which, regardless of how urgent it is, needs a deadline for organization, would take place after 23 days, from the constitutional possible term of 30 days, meaning February 26, but since it is not a Sunday, let's say even earlier, on February 23.
Let's say the recall referendum would pass. From that moment, the presidential elections should be organized within 3 months, on May 23, later than May 4, the day when the presidential elections are already scheduled. And this with even tighter deadlines than in 2012.
There would also be substantial costs to discuss regarding this endeavor. On the one hand, those of the referendum itself, which in 2012 cost 95 million lei. Obviously, now it would be much more expensive.
On the other hand, the costs of instability for a country that is already borrowing, according to the Minister of Finance, at an interest rate of 7.9%. We can anticipate what would happen to the country's rating, foreign investments, and stock market performance.
Another major issue would be the reason for the suspension. The Constitution provides for this extreme measure for serious offenses that violate the provisions of the Constitution. Which specific offense in this case?
The President has remained in office by virtue of Decision 32/2024 of the CCR. Correct or not, Decision 32 is the basis for extending the mandate, and Klaus Iohannis has not barricaded himself in the Cotroceni Palace.
You cannot suspend the President because he respects a decision of the CCR when the suspension is precisely the sanction for violating the Constitution. In these 10 years, there would certainly have been grounds for suspension, but the one invoked now is exactly the opposite.
I also see a discussion about the fact that the chamber presidents should ask the CCR to ascertain the vacancy of the presidential office. How can the CCR ascertain such a thing when the CCR itself established, in Decision 32, that the position is not vacant because Klaus Iohannis will exercise it until the new president takes the oath?
In fact, the current supporters of the suspension do not even compare to the force of the USL in 2012, and, as I mentioned, they have not even managed to convene an extraordinary session.
Besides the minimum one-third of signatories required for the suspension, it is unlikely that there would be a majority of 233 parliamentarians so irresponsible as to cause this chaos and the associated costs. However, the electoral pressure would be significant, given the accumulated anger against Mr. Iohannis.
That is precisely why President Iohannis would do this country a great favor if he were to resign after February 4, so that the 3 months of interim would extend until May 4. Another disruption of the electoral calendar, already so difficultly born, would not benefit anyone.
But, as I have said before, keeping Klaus Iohannis at the Cotroceni Palace is a gift to extremists and a successful rallying point until the day of the vote.