As the world debates how to stop the war in Ukraine, one truth becomes increasingly clear: Putin himself cannot end it. For several reasons.
After three years of war, the Russian military power is a shadow of what it was on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine. Its mechanized forces, essential for its military strategies, are depleted and now include military trucks worthy of a museum, civilian cars, motorcycles, and even donkeys. This is not a force prepared for victory.
To win, by any rational definition of the term "win," Russia must conquer more than the current 20% of Ukrainian territory it occupies.
First and foremost, Russia must at least consolidate its control over the largest regions in eastern Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk. They are still tens of kilometers away from even reaching this modest goal, notes Newsweek.
Advancing these tens of kilometers is becoming increasingly difficult for the Russian and North Korean troops of around half a million soldiers as the war approaches its 38th month. And that for one main reason.
The first reason: the poor situation on the front line
The types of forces on which the Russian army traditionally relies for rapid marches into enemy territory are disappearing on the 1,120 km front line seeded with mines, defended with artillery, and patrolled with drones.
Russia's tank regiments and brigades, tracked combat vehicles, mobile howitzers, and a multitude of supply trucks simply no longer exist. For generations of Russian planners, "the goal was to penetrate the enemy's first line and follow this up with a strong mechanized second echelon to exploit the initial breakthrough," wrote Dutch officer Randy Noorman for the Modern War Institute at West Point.
These plans can no longer be implemented now.
Advancing many kilometers per day behind the poorly defended enemy forces in the front line requires protected mobility.
But that outdated protected mobility can largely be overcome by old and new weapons: artillery and mines that have not changed much in 100 years and explosive drones, which are deployed on a scale that practically no one imagined a few years ago.
The mines, artillery, and especially drones are now so dense along the front line that tanks and other armored vehicles "simply do not reach the launch line of an attack," according to a Russian military blogger - they are blown up kilometers away from enemy positions.
Although it is a problem that affects both sides, it bothers the Russians more than the Ukrainians because the former cannot win without conquering territory, they must attack.
On the other hand, limiting the Russian forces represents a significant victory for the Ukrainians. By keeping the Russians in their current positions, the Government, economy, and culture of Ukraine - and the potential for future military actions - can withstand.
While it is true that the Russians have achieved significant successes in eastern Ukraine during an abrupt and temporary freeze of American aid, which deprived the Ukrainian forces of urgently needed ammunition, the Ukrainians have replenished their ammunition stocks, secured new European supply lines, and even prepared the ground for new ammunition factories.
Even as American intransigence deepens in Trump's new mandate and Congress is controlled by Republicans, Ukraine is in a much better position to resist Russian attacks now than it was at the beginning of 2024. Each Russian attack is met with a surge of firepower.
Ultimately, the numbers tell the story.
As the war heads into its fourth year, Russian losses of tanks, combat vehicles, and other heavy equipment have exceeded 20,000 pieces, according to analysts from the Oryx information group, who confirm each loss with frontline images. There are more vehicles than the entire British army has in its inventory.
Russia's new production adds only a few hundred new vehicles per month.
This is the main, military reason why Putin cannot win the war in Ukraine, but there are others. There are five traps he built himself and fell into, as shown in an analysis published by Kyiv Post.
The return of war-ravaged Russians
Over 700,000 Russian soldiers have fought in Ukraine, many of them poorly trained, traumatized, or brutalized by war. Those who return home often carry deep emotional and psychological wounds - some of them become violent and commit crimes such as assaults, rapes, or murders.
Furthermore, as Russia's mobilization resources are depleted, the Kremlin has turned to recruiting prisoners - including individuals convicted of extremely violent crimes. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia, Mariana Katzarova, confirmed that about 170,000 convicted violent offenders have been recruited to fight in Ukraine.
Ending the war would mean flooding Russian society with more war-ravaged and dangerous individuals. The Kremlin fears the chaos that will follow.
The war-based economy
Russia's economy has been reoriented around war. Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion, the Kremlin has redirected massive state resources towards the war machine - from tanks and rockets to uniforms and drones. Defense expenditures in 2025 will amount to almost 30% of the federal budget - a staggering figure, higher than in any year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
According to Bloomberg and other independent sources, military and security expenditures will account for almost 40% of all federal spending. This means that one in three rubles the government currently spends goes to war.
Entire industries - metallurgy, chemicals, electronics - have been reoriented to serve military production. Many regions in Russia see their local economies revitalized not through innovation or trade, but through the booming demand for weapons and ammunition.
And, more surprisingly, despite Western sanctions and economic isolation, Russia's GDP grew slightly in 2023, by around 3.6%, according to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat. But this jump is largely artificial, driven by war spending, not sustainable development. It is an illusion of prosperity fueled by militarism and death.
Ending the war would mean stopping the entire war economy. Most likely, Putin does not want to find out what happens if that engine stops. For the regime, war is no longer just a political tool - it is an economic lifeline.
War as political cover
As long as the war continues, Putin enjoys a dangerous type of immunity. The war silences dissent, mutes criticism, and justifies authoritarianism. Everything, from poverty to censorship to assassinations, is justified under the slogan "We are at war."
Under the cover of this war, Putin has eliminated key opponents. Russia's cultural elite has fled or been silenced. What remains is a society more easily controlled by Putin.
Basic services are collapsing in Russia. Healthcare is underfunded, infrastructure is crumbling. Putin promised to move people out of Soviet-era barracks over 20 years ago, but now he is building apartment blocks in the occupied and destroyed Mariupol. The message is clear: war matters, not people.
Putin does not want peace because war makes him untouchable and allows him to avoid responsibility, crush opposition, and present himself not as a dictator, but as a "wartime leader." Peace would force people to ask questions, such as - why is Putin still in power after 25 years.
No victory, no way out
Putin launched the invasion with grand objectives: "denazification" of Ukraine, overthrowing the government in Kiev, and stopping NATO expansion. None of these have been achieved - he did not take Kiev in three days. He did not destroy the Ukrainian identity. He did not "denazify" anything. What he has accomplished is exactly the opposite of what he promised.
Today's Ukraine is more united, determined, and militarily capable than ever. It has one of the most experienced and fortified armies in Europe. Ukrainian startups in the defense sector produce drones, electronic warfare tools, and missile components not only for their own army but also in cooperation with global military giants like Rheinmetall and Saab. Ukraine is not only defending itself but becoming part of the Western military-industrial ecosystem.
Generations of Ukrainians will never forget what Russia has done. The traumas, war crimes, stolen children – these scars will last for decades. The hatred towards Russia is now deep, personal, generational.
And while Ukrainians fight for a free future, they are also restoring their history, language, and culture, suppressed for centuries under Moscow's rule. Ukrainian books, films, music, and theaters are thriving. Each Russian rocket only strengthens the national awakening that Putin wanted to prevent.
Meanwhile, Russia isolates itself and becomes poorer and more authoritarian. And this is the real problem for the Kremlin: a free and successful Ukraine is a direct threat to Putin's regime. Because it shows his people that there is another way – one where you don't need a dictator to survive.
So how can Putin talk about victory by capturing a few ruined cities while his country loses influence, global respect, and millions of lives? For the Kremlin leader, there is no exit strategy.
The Illusion of NATO's Defeat
One of the main reasons Putin launched his large-scale invasion was his 2021 ultimatum to the US and NATO: withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe and a return to the 1997 status quo. He believed that war would scare the West and make it retreat. In fact, it turned out the other way around.
NATO is now larger, stronger, and closer to Russia's borders than ever. Finland, with its 1,300-kilometer border, joined the alliance. Sweden followed suit immediately.
What was once a buffer zone is now a direct frontier with NATO troops and hardware. This is not what Putin asked for; it's a historic expansion of Western military presence.
Furthermore, the European Union is arming itself. For the first time in decades, EU leaders are seriously discussing the formation of a common defense bloc independent of the US, focused on European collective security. The EU aims to become militarily independent by 2030, a tectonic shift entirely driven by Putin's aggression.
Instead of weakening the West, Putin has united it. Instead of stopping NATO, he has supercharged the alliance. Instead of dividing Europe, he has made it more determined than ever to resist autocracy.
Now Putin cannot stop, even though the more he advances, the worse it gets. He is caught in a war he started but cannot end.
What's Next?
Putin not only started this war but built a system that depends on him psychologically, economically, and politically. And the truth is, he cannot end this war alone. Either he must achieve all his initial objectives, which are now completely unattainable, or he is forced to calm down by overwhelming internal or external pressure.
In any other situation, Putin will prolong the war as much as possible because otherwise, his political regime collapses.
This war is no longer about Ukraine. It's about keeping one man in power and preserving a lie. Until that lie is shattered, from within or without, the war will continue. Not because Putin is strong, but because he is too weak to stop, concludes the cited analysis.