The negotiation of the government program and the composition of the future government is under the sign of political realities that decisively mark the entire process.
1. The first months of the future government will be marked by the presidential election campaign, and not just any campaign, but one marked by extreme populism, messianism, and paroxysmal emotions. So, any decision with negatively felt effects, even if extremely correct, will radicalize those affected in their voting behavior.
2. Generally, the first months of governance are the ones in which the most unpopular decisions are made, against the backdrop of the political bonus of the winners who have come to power. However, this time we have no winners and no bonus.
Pro-Western parties have been hit by a train and are trying to put together a government that reconciles two conflicting realities. The extremely serious economic one and the electoral one we talked about in point 1.
3. This reconciliation is even more difficult as not only any restrictions are electorally contraindicated, but the parties in government, or at least some of them, will most likely be rivals in the presidential competition.
The situation can only be avoided if all parties in government have a common candidate, which is extremely improbable, if not outright impossible. We will not even have a government of four.
So, each party will try to position itself as best as possible in the beauty contest, as we already see in the negotiations. The maximal list, with populist touches, and the ultimatum tone given by USR to the other pro-European parties transparently reflect the intention to remain in opposition and approach the presidential elections from there, with Elena Lasconi.
It is true that the traditional parties do not seem to have understood much from the recent vote, but neither is USR a champion of wisdom if it believes that the electorate shocked by the rise of extremists is eager for another round of scandal. It remains to be seen how much of USR's electorate will appreciate their position and how much will consider that they are once again running away from governance.
On the other hand, the effects of the electoral competition on governance have been seen this year, and the need for serious reforms was not as acute.
In these conditions, traditional parties avoid stepping out of generalities and assuming unpopular measures in their electorate area, such as a massive and necessary restructuring of the budgetary apparatus in which both PSD and PNL have a strong electoral base.
As expected, the focus is on populist measures such as overtaxing large fortunes. What does a large fortune mean? And why do we overtax the visible fortunes, already taxed, instead of going after the hidden fortunes in tax havens?
Equally predictable is that this government, most likely with a razor-thin majority, will serve as a bridge until the presidential elections, which must be invested as soon as possible, to set the election date and at least take measures to halt the decline and allay investor fears, so that the necessary serious corrections will only begin after the presidential elections.