Bogdan Peșchir’s actions, the 35-year-old programmer detained by prosecutors, represent just the tip of the iceberg in the complicated and costly operation carried out by Russian agents with the help of influence networks in Romania, both old and new, to impose Călin Georgescu as president of Romania.
Peșchir spent over a million dollars in direct payments to TikTok influencers.
„The plan to interfere in the 2024 presidential elections initially involved increasing the notoriety of the named Peșchir Bogdan online, especially on the social media platform TikTok with the username bogpr, by offering gifts to achieve a high level of popularity. This objective was achieved by reaching level 50, the highest in Romania and among the highest in Europe,” according to the prosecutors’ report investigating the programmer from Brașov.
"Based on the data obtained so far in the criminal investigation, only in relation to the election campaign period, Peșchir Bogdan provided an amount of approximately one million euros to influence voters to vote for Georgescu Călin," the investigators announce.
The General Prosecutor's investigation focuses on a piece of the larger puzzle that was the operation to install a pro-Russian president in Romania.
Peșchir also financed a category of influencers with impact in a specific area of society where political messages do not reach, or if they do, they are not very important, where social involvement and voter turnout are low.
These are people who do not have access to education, have precarious material conditions, are not integrated into society, and have fallen prey to the control of criminal groups.
Influencers on TikTok from this area of society are interpreters of manele music, MMA fighters, leaders of local criminal gangs, and mobsters.
A bizarre situation among liberals
Neglected, disadvantaged, and marginalized individuals who lack access to verified information, are not interested in politics, and are disappointed by the lack of involvement of authorities, have represented an important reservoir of easily obtainable votes through manipulation, without being targeted by parliamentary party strategies out of convenience or lack of financial resources.
In addition to the operation led and financed by Peșchir, there was at least one more on TikTok following the same model, involving influencers, but from a different social area and with a different target, namely middle-class voters living in urban areas.
Let's remember the #BalanceAndVerticality campaign on TikTok with the help of account holders with over 20,000 followers.
This campaign was carried out by a significant communication agency, paid by the PNL, which was diverted at one point, whether premeditated or not, by liberal representatives in favor of Călin Georgescu.
The bizarre situation that unfolded within the PNL camp was first reported by journalists from the snoop.ro site in a press investigation.
Similarities between the hybrid attack in Moldova and Romania
But the hybrid attack front carried out by Russia on Romania is more extensive. There were WhatsApp groups of active or reserve military personnel infiltrated by agents, TikTok campaigns focused on the diaspora, many communities of Romanians working abroad were also infiltrated.
There were thousands of Facebook pages with millions of views that, on command, began to support Georgescu.
Peșchir's detention also means the possibility for him to speak, provide names of collaborators, describe financial flows, and provide key information for the continuation of the investigation.
With the start of actions by the Romanian authorities, several mysterious messages came from the Kremlin signaling support for Georgescu, culminating with the one given by the foreign intelligence agency, SVR.
Furthermore, the network of influencers led and financed by Bogdan Peșchir was also used in the elections in Moldova, where authorities have shown and published a report on Kremlin interference.
Influencer Culiță Sterp appears in the Romanian prosecutors' report as having received $14,000 from Peșchir to promote Călin Georgescu illegally on TikTok.
Just a month before, the same Culiță Sterp was campaigning for Alexandr Stoianoglu, the pro-Russian candidate who made it to the final round of the presidential elections in Moldova, defeated by Maia Sandu.
Sterp is a composer and manele singer with 3.1 million followers on TikTok.
There are many similarities between the strategies used in Moldova and Romania. From the clues provided by the investigations so far, as well as the SIS report, Moldova's security service, it appears that for the manipulation of Romania's presidential elections, a heavy emphasis was placed on online and social media, with millions of euros spent, while in Moldova, in addition to online efforts, there was also a cash-for-votes operation involving funds brought in from Moscow.
Africa, gold, and Georgescu, common points in the attack on Romania
There is another indirect connection between Peșchir and Russia, supported by a series of clues.
Peșchir's boss was Gabriel Prodănescu, a Romanian who left the country in 1995, settling in South Africa, as shown in one of the SRI reports released immediately after the first round of the presidential elections.
There he began to develop various businesses, especially in the computer field, which led him to Peșchir, a programmer from Romania.
At some point, Prodănescu began to specialize in cryptocurrencies and had several business initiatives in this field with dubious success.
Also in Africa, over the past decade, there has been an intersection between Horațiu Potra, a mercenary and former member of the foreign legion, and the Romanian-born billionaire Frank Timiș, involved in rare metals and diamond businesses.
During the same period, Evgheni Prigojin, the head of the Wagner Group, Russia's private army, began to get involved in Africa, also targeting rare metals, gold, and diamonds businesses.
There is a possibility that Prodănescu and Potra were recruited by Russian intelligence agents who were part of the Wagner Group to establish a financial, military, and communication infrastructure to support Călin Georgescu at the right moment.
"I made money, I worked for the king of Qatar, I worked for presidents in Africa, I brought all the money to Romania. And no one forces me to keep my money in the bank... I also worked for Mr. Frank Timiș, from 2012 to 2018, I made money, it's true. Yes, and the company in England, it's true, I made money from the English company...," stated Horațiu Potra, who fled abroad after prosecutors found over $1.3 million at his residence.
Gabriel Prodănescu, Horațiu Potra, Frank Timiș moved on the same coordinates, with businesses in Africa and England, during the same periods of time, but also with a similar political objective, supporting Călin Georgescu.
Slowly but surely, the pieces of a giant puzzle are starting to fall into place, but the landscape emerging from the combination of components is a frightening, complicated one that raises a question: Why was there no reaction to the immense hybrid attack on Romania that began at least a decade ago?