The reports presented by intelligence agencies at Cotroceni mention 25,000 TikTok accounts, coordinated from Russia, 100 online influencers paid by a marketing company, as well as actual vote buying and the involvement of extremist organizations and religious cults.
During a press conference held at the Palace of the Parliament, businessman Dan Șucu, also the owner of the Rapid Bucharest football club, expressed concern that „according to our estimates, over 50 million euros have been spent so far on running campaigns for Călin Georgescu on social networks.”
1,183 accounts used „#CG11” in all clips posted on TikTok. Of these, 157 were registered on TikTok after the creation of the Telegram channel, and 76 were created and used exclusively to post promotional content, the rest being associated with real individuals voluntarily posting pro-Călin Georgescu content.
SRI Report, Presidential Administration
"They're spending up to 3 million euros a day," Șucu added. These expenses are in addition to the money paid to the two supporting television stations - Realitatea TV and RTV, also outside legal regulations, as well as offline campaign expenses.
Comparing with the funds available to parties that conducted legal election campaigns with budget funds, over 100 million euros have been invested in Călin Georgescu so far to make him the President of Romania.
It is noteworthy that some of the Telegram groups where Călin Georgescu supporters have coalesced were created in September 2022. For example, the Călin Georgescu - Country Project group was created to promote the candidate's narrative, along with four similar Telegram groups.
SRI Report, Presidential Administration
This is an enormous sum that could not have been raised or paid by a single person or even a group in our country without foreign funding.
The Zero Candidate
Two TikTok network executives, Caroline Greer, director of public policy and government relations, and Brie Pegum, global product director, were questioned in the European Parliament regarding the political promotion of Călin Georgescu in the Romanian presidential elections.
The representatives of the Chinese social media network admitted that at least one of the paid campaigns on TikTok was supported by an entity from Russia, specifically the propaganda media conglomerate Sputnik.
During the parliamentary elections on December 1, dozens of TikTok accounts were noticed falsely using the SRI logo and the Antiterrorist Brigade (BAT) designation, displaying thousands of followers and over 100,000 likes.
SRI Report, Presidential Administration
Călin Georgescu has repeatedly stated that he has not spent a single euro on the electoral campaign, that everything was done by volunteers, hence his nickname "the zero candidate."
However, such a statement has proven to be a lie, and several criminal complaints have been filed against him for violating current legislation.
The Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) is one of the agencies that have alerted prosecutors about the campaign of candidate Călin Georgescu.
"...we do not know who ordered the posters, who made them, and how much they cost, which is why we have asked the law enforcement agencies in each county, where we were informed that these were displayed, with photos and so on, to investigate and identify where they were printed, who ordered them, who paid for them, so that a causal link can be made between this and what we will have to do next," stated Toni Greblă, the president of AEP.
The situation is much more serious because there are already many pieces of evidence provided by state institutions and experts indicating that Romania is under attack by Russia, aiming for political, social, and economic destabilization.
Romania Under Russia's Attack
"...it has been confirmed that, in the current regional security and especially electoral context, Romania, along with other Eastern NATO flank states, has become a priority for the hostile actions of state and non-state actors, especially the Russian Federation, which has shown an increasing interest in influencing the public agenda in Romanian society and social cohesion," as stated in the CSAT press release dated November 28.
The institutional passivity this year is hard to understand and explain, given the known dangers posed by the border conflict and the fact that Russia interferes in the elections of democratic states, experiences endured by other EU countries.
Both parliamentarians from the SRI Control Commission and the President of Romania previously announced that there is no danger and they have not been informed about possible interferences.
Such a strategy resembles the decision made by Iohannis at the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine to provide as little information as possible about the support we offer to the neighboring country. This approach indicates either a misjudgment regarding the impact of the war on our society or the existence of information that many Russian influence agents operate in Romania, capable of creating a pro-Kremlin opinion trend.
Both possibilities have materialized from the unfolding events, and the decisions made at both the presidential and governmental levels have been incorrect.
What the Intelligence Agencies' Documents Say
"The network of accounts directly associated with Călin Georgescu's campaign initially consisted of 25,000 accounts on the TikTok platform, which became very active two weeks before the electoral date. The promotional campaign was very well organized, with a significant increase in the number of followers," according to the SRI report declassified by Klaus Iohannis on Wednesday, December 4, 2024.
The decision to release the reports of the SIE, SRI, and MAI, which formed the basis of the CSAT communication on November 28, shows how serious the situation in Romania is and how strongly it has been affected by Russia's interference in the electoral process.
"Specialized technical checks in the online environment and the analysis of metric values in the online environment, mainly on the TikTok platform, in the context of the electoral process, validated the existence of an electoral campaign not labeled as such, in which, starting from November 2024, over 100 online influencers, with a total of over 8 million active followers, were subjected to manipulation regarding the promoted candidate," as stated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs report.
Extremists, Criminals, and Religious Leaders Fall into Kremlin's Trap
The data presented to the public by the presidential administration indicates a deep involvement of Russian agents in our country's political system.
Moreover, the report confirms what both Spotmedia.ro and other independent publications have claimed in recent weeks, that Russian intelligence services are using the same tactics applied in the electoral process in Moldova. Furthermore, the amounts involved were much larger.
Subsequent checks revealed that TikTok did not remove the electoral content as requested by the AEP, and it continued to be available to the public in Romania, even after the end of the electoral campaign, including on the day of the elections (aspects that contradict Romanian legislation).
SRI Report, Presidential Administration
The Ministry of Internal Affairs report reveals that Romanian influencers were paid through a specialized platform, the name of which is known to authorities but was blacked out in the document.
"Some of the campaign supporters involved in promoting and vote buying, are representatives of extremist right-wing environments, criminal environments, and religious cults, previously involved in promoting pro-Russian, anti-Semitic, anti-NATO narratives, or against Ukraine," as highlighted in the document prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Not only does the report inform the public that foreign actors conducted a manipulation operation on Romanian soil, but they also bought votes, undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process.
How Moscow sees us
"Romania is perceived by decision-making centers in Moscow as an enemy state," the report produced by the Foreign Intelligence Service and presented at CSAT states.
Our country "has become a priority for Russia's hostile actions, with a growing interest at the Kremlin to influence the public agenda in Romanian society in the electoral context," the SIE report further states.
The publication of the documents two days before the second round of the presidential elections created an earthquake in Romania's political system, as well as fear in society.
For the first time since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, rational citizens in Romania are discovering the extent of Russia's influence in our country and the forces behind candidate Călin Georgescu.