As the messianics we adore, those who are supposed to save us even by breaking some principles for which we would otherwise tear our clothes, it was Ilie Bolojan’s turn to be thrown from the glory of great expectations into the abyss of total disappointment with the customary curses when he revealed the forgetting of the magic wand in the office in Oradea. What a disappointment, oh the misfortune! It was not the deceived expectations that were, in fact, impossible and, viewed politically coldly, even toxic.
Let’s take them one by one. Ilie Bolojan is reproached for:
1. Leading PNL into a governing coalition similar to that of stability, thus betraying the popular vote. Horrible similarity, that's right. But the political composition of the government faithfully reflects the vote on December 1.
And what was the arithmetic alternative? We experienced it for a few hours, after PSD announced that they were going into opposition and would support a minority government on a case-by-case basis. What would that have meant in practice?
A minority government that would have to beg for every vote from a PSD in the ideal situation of deciding everything without bearing any of the governance's passive burdens. And the passive would be precisely fixing the inheritance of the Ciolacu 1 government.
But who would have formed the minority government? One option would have been the extremists. Another option would have been the pro-Europeans. However, both UDMR and USR refused to participate in a minority government. So a minority government of PNL with 14% in the electoral campaign? Beyond the political suicide of the liberals, was it realistic?
2. Not blocking, from the height of PNL's 14 percent, the appointment of Marcel Ciolacu as prime minister. Yes, PNL's percentages in the parliamentary elections are low, but almost double compared to Nicolae Ciucă's score in the presidential elections on November 24, thanks to a huge communication effort by Ilie Bolojan in the week between the scrutiny.
And how exactly could he have blocked the appointment, while through the vote on December 1, PSD won the elections with its president included? He could have done it in one way only. By blocking the government formation.
It was also the only way to try to force the inclusion in the government, against PSD's will, of a USR whose behavior during negotiations does not offer certainty that they sincerely wanted to be in government with the Social Democrats, under Prime Minister Ciolacu, considering the upcoming 2.0 presidential elections.
Even USR deputy Radu Mihaiu stated that Ilie Bolojan and Ciprian Ciucu insisted as much as they could for USR to be in the government. It was also politically advantageous for them to diminish PSD's strength and to attempt a small alliance within the big alliance, especially since Ilie Bolojan and Kelemen Hunor are not necessarily the best of friends.
But what would have been the price of blocking the government formation? If the famous emergency ordinance train with numerous postponements of increases is not issued by December 31, the budget collapses. Marcel Ciolacu used the leverage of this emergency ordinance by refusing to issue it in the previous government while still having the right to get everything he wanted in negotiations.
So what does Ilie Bolojan need to do to meet expectations? Be equally irresponsible?
It is ignored that Ilie Bolojan's success in Oradea was based on a lot of political pragmatism; the liberal leader always made the necessary alliances, with UDMR and with PSD, to deliver. That was always his goal, not whining about helplessness. Whether it's good or bad, everyone can judge, perhaps by looking towards Oradea and Bihor.
3. The joint candidacy of Crin Antonescu. The joint candidate was a condition of PSD, without which there could be neither a government nor the emergency ordinance train. And a joint candidate was chosen based on the expectations of the PSD and PNL electorates, in the order of political percentages.
It seems that many of those who now faint with indignation forget that Ilie Bolojan was part of the old PNL, including under Crin Antonescu's leadership, including in the USL, including in the referendum for the dismissal of Traian Băsescu.
Ilie Bolojan was marginalized by Klaus Iohannis. He is not a userist or a progressive. Just as he was proposed as prime minister by Elena Lasconi. Was he good back then?
I have no doubt that for the PNL electorate, Crin Antonescu is a satisfactory option. For them, he was a successful leader.
I don't know if Mr. Antonescu was the first choice, I don't know if Mr. Bolojan is enthusiastic, but what I know for sure is that he couldn't impose Nicușor Dan or Elena Lasconi as a joint candidate on PSD, even though after the first round he was the first political leader to unconditionally support them for the final round.
4. Not reforming PNL in a month. He took over a party in shock after the first round, unstable for a long time, divided into all kinds of groups, practically without a president for years, emasculated by Klaus Iohannis.
The reform work is just beginning. I wouldn't bet that Ilie Bolojan's mathematical and quite militaristic style is the dream of some political tricksters, liars, and sometimes downright scoundrels.
The PNL ministerial team is not necessarily a delight. The presence of Marcel Boloș there is disappointing, but I wonder what names he had at his disposal given the terrible shortage of personnel in a PNL he barely took over in a pitiful state.
I wouldn't overlook the fact that two new and relevant names in the government are in the PNL positions for Education and Foreign Affairs. The co-optation of Mr. Daniel David, the rector of UBB, is the first glimmer of hope after years of darkness for the struggling Education sector.
So, ultimately, what is Ilie Bolojan reproached for so far? That he didn't achieve a miracle? Some essential urgencies have been addressed, starting with having a government to stabilize the budgetary aspect and kick off the election calendar.
That doesn't mean he can't truly fail miserably. The battles are just beginning in an extremely complicated governance and in a party like a hungry snake. Right now, the snakes are in shock under the rocks, after the elections, but they will soon recover and try to regain power.